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COMMENT
GUN CONTROL AND ECONOMIC
DISCRIMINATION: THE MELTINGPOINT CASE-IN-PONT
T. MARKUS FUNK*
"Setting a high minimum price for handguns would be an effective means of reducing availability to precisely those groups that account for the bulk of the violent crime problem."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, an estimated daily average of 36 people were murdered
with handguns, 32 women were raped at gunpoint, 931 people were
the victims of armed robberies, and 1557 people were assaulted with a
gun in the United States.2 During the same year, handgun crimes
accounted for approximately thirteen percent of all documented violent crimes.3 Some states have attempted to bridle such illegal firearm
violence with "melting-point laws." The Illinois, South Carolina, Hawaii, and Minnesota legislatures have adopted rigid melting-point
schemes designed to remove so-called Saturday Night Specials from
4
the market.
Illinois, for example, prohibits the sale of handguns having "a
barrel, slide, frame or receiver which is a die casting of zinc alloy or
any other nonhomogeneous metal which will melt or deform at temperatures of less than 800 degrees Fahrenheit."5 South Carolina and
* The author would like to thank Don B. Kates, Jr. and Daniel D. Polsby for their

thoughtful comments on previous drafts, RobertJ. Cottrol for discussing the issues with me
early on in the writing process, and Gary Kleck for his helpful suggestions and recent data.
I Philip Cook, The "SaturdayNight Special": An Assessment of Alternative Definitionsfrom a
Policy Perspective 72 J. CRUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735, 1740 (1981).
2 U.S. DFPT oFJUTsIE, GUNS AND CRIME 1 (1994).

3 Id.
4 See720 ILCS 5/24-3(h) (Smith-Hurd 1993); S.C. CODEANN. § 23-31-180 (Law. Co-op.
1990); HAW. REv. STAT. § 134-16 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.712(4) (West 1987).
5 720 ILCS 5/24-3(h) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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Hawaii have enacted laws virtually identical to Illinois, and Minnesota
has enacted a similar law which has a 1000 degree melting point requirement and prohibits handguns with less than a certain "tensile
strength" (resistance of the metal to longitudinal stress) and handguns that are made of a powdered metal less than a certain density. 6
The net effect on the handgun market is hard to determine precisely, but in South Carolina, the melting-point laws, along with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms regulations, have resulted in
bans on approximately ten percent of the handguns available on the
retail market.7 It is undisputed, however, that the handguns which
fail to meet the melting-point requirements are made of cheaper
materials and are the least expensive. 8 While there are manufacturers
that produce handguns which both meet the melting-point standards
and are less expensive than the premium makes, the sub-group of
guns banned by the melting-point laws is the most affordable, and
therefore the most accessible, segment of the handgun market. 9
Thus, the net effect of the melting-point laws has been to eliminate
the most affordable segment of handguns from the market. 10
The primary arguments made 'in support of melting-point laws
are threefold: (1) handguns which lack "quality materials" also often
lack adequate safety and accuracy mechanisms and, thus, are not useful to sportsmen;" (2) handguns not meeting the melting-point requirements are made of softer metal, therefore making it more
difficult for ballistics experts to identify these guns, and making it eas6 The Minnesota Legislature has adopted the following definition of a Saturday Night
Special:
[Hiaving a frame, barrel, cylinder, slide or breechblock:
(a) of any material having a melting point (liquidus) of less than 1,000 degrees
Fahrenheit, or
(b) of any material having an ultimate tensile strength of less than 55,000 pounds
per square inch, or
(c) of any powdered metal having density of less than 7.5 grams per cubic
centimeter.
Mn. STAT. ANN. § 624.712(4) (West 1987).
7 Monica Fennell, Missing the Mark in Maryland: How PoorDrafting and Implementation
Vitiated a Model State Gun ControlLaw,13 HAMLmEJ. Pun. L. & PoLr" 37,49 (1992) (arguing
that more states should adopt melting-point laws to remove inexpensive handguns from
the market).
8 Id. at 58. See also Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153 n.9 (Md. 1985)
(discussing widespread availability of Saturday Night Specials due to their "extremely low
retail price"); 1LG.Indus., Inc. v. Askew, 276 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973) (characterizing Saturday Night Specials as "cheap").
9 See Cook, supranote 1, at 1740 (arguing that the cheapest of the domestically manufactured handguns would be eliminated from the market by establishing minimum standards stipulating the quality of metal and safety features of a gun).
10 See id.
I See Fennell, supra note 7, at 60. See also Keley, 497 A.2d at 1154 n.10.
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ier for criminals to file off the serial numbers;' 2 and (3) the Saturday
Night Specials which the melting-point laws target are the weapons of
choice for criminals, and their removal from the marketplace will
3
therefore reduce the criminals' access to firearms.'
On the other hand, a compelling argument can be made that
melting-point laws (1) are arbitrary in determining which handguns
they ultimately remove from the market; (2) may have a negative effect
on the ability of the police to track down criminals through the use of
ballistics tests; (3)do not contribute to crime reduction; and (4) discriminate against the poor who cannot afford to purchase more expensive handguns.
This Comment will endeavor to avoid the emotionalism which
tends to permeate the gun control controversy by focusing on possible
legal, factual, and policy flaws which may undermine the arguments
advanced in justification of the melting-point laws.
II.

THE JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF
MELTING-POINT LAws

A.

PREMISE 1: THE HANDGUNS TAKEN OFF THE MARKET BY MELTINGPOINT LAWS ARE NOT USEFUL FOR SPORTSMEN

This argument is misleading. It erroneously assumes that the
only legitimate use of handguns will be for sport. Many citizens buy
handguns for self-defense, not target shooting; 14 indeed, a significant
percentage of the public agrees that "personal protection" is a legitimate reason for owning a gun,' 5 and at least one-half of all U.S. house12 See Fennell, supra note 7, at 58 (citing Cook, supra note 1, at 1740). See also Kelley,
497 A.2d at 1153 n.9 ("Generally, the weapon is manufactured from soft, inexpensive
metal. As a result, serial numbers are easily and sometimes completely erased by either
filing or melting.").
13 See Cook, supra note 1, at 1740 ("Individuals who would not ordinarily be able to
afford an expensive gun commit a disproportionate share of violent crimes. Setting a high
minimum price for handguns would be an effective means of reducing availability to precisely those groups that account for the bulk of the violent crime problem.").
14 In fact, 40-50% of the existing stock was purchased primarily for self-defense purposes. SeeJaMEs D. WRicrr & PETER Rossi, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WEAPONs, CRIME AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 26 (1981). See also Timothy Egan, After the Riots: Los Angeles Riots
Spurring Big Rise in Sale of Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at Al (noting national surge in
gun purchases in wake of Los Angeles riots).
15 James D. Wright, Public Opinion and Gun Controk A Comparison of Results From Two
Recent National Sureys, 455 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sa. 24, 31 (1981) (stating that
49% think they need protection). See also Donald E. Santarelli & Nicholas E. Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take ProductsLiability to the Limit, 14 ST.MARYS
L.J. 471, 481 (1983) (arguing that social utility of handguns for self-defense purposes cannot be "reasonably denied, no matter what position one takes on the need for gun
control").
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holds keep firearms., 6 Most importantly, criminologists and criminal
law scholars have increasingly begun to agree that the public is right.' 7
But the notion that usefulness for a "sporting purpose" should be
a qualifyingfactor in handgun regulation is not rejected only by those
who own guns. Using this criterion to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable handguns fails to recognize other legitimate
purposes for acquiring a handgun. The 1968 Gun Control Act clearly
recognized that sporting uses are not the only legitimate purposes for
acquiring a handgun: "[I] t is not the purpose of this title to place any
undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions on handguns and law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trapshooting, target
shooting, personalprotection, or any other lawful activity... ."18 Therefore, the argument that sportsmen will not find these guns useful appears to miss the mark, since it ignores the fact that the primary
reason for most legal handgun purchases is legitimate self-defense-a
use to which guns are put between one million and 2.5 million times a
19
year.
B.

PREMISE

2:

THE HANDGUNS

TAKEN OFF THE MARKET BY MELTING-

POINT LAWS ARE HARDER FOR BALLISTICS EXPERTS TO TRACE,
AND IT IS EASIER TO REMOVE THEIR SERIAL NUMBERS

According to ballistics experts, cheaper guns, such as those which
do not meet the melting-point law requirements, are no harder to
trace ballistically than their more expensive counterparts. 20 A brief
discussion of ballistics demonstrates the reasons for this.
"Tool marks" are impressions made to either the bullet or the
cartridge case by irregularities in the handgun's barrel, firing pin,
chamber, or cylinder (cuts, nicks, striations, etc.). Ballistics experts
16 GARY KULCK, PonrT BLANK 102 (1991).
17 See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of CivilianArms Possessionas a Deterrentto Crime or
Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRiAM. L 113, 164 (1991) ("The evidence from surveys of

both civilians and felons is that actual defensive handgun uses are enormously more frequent than has previously been realized .... Widespread defensive gun ownership benefits society as a whole by deterring burglars from entering occupied premises and by
deterring from confrontation offenses altogether an unknown proportion of criminals
...

."); Hans Toch & Alan J. Lizotte, Research and Policy: The Case of Gun Control in PSYCH.

AND Soc. POL'Y 223 (Peter Suedfeld & Philip E. Tetlock eds., 1992) ("[H]igh saturations of

guns in places, or something correlated with that condition, inhibit illegal aggression.").
18 HANDGUN CONTROL Acr OF 1968, Pub. L No. 90-618 § 101, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1993)) (emphasis added).
19 Gary Kleck (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Criminal Law &

Criminology).
20 Telephone Interview with Emanuel Kapelsohn, President of the Peregrine Corporation (Jan. 26, 1994).
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use these irregularities to match a specific bullet or cartridge to a specific gun.2 1 For example, a metallurgical irregularity in the breach
face, firing pin, chamber, extractor, or ejector may leave unique and
ballistically traceable marks on the cartridge. 22 Similar marks can be
made when the bullet passes through the bore of the gun.28
Contrary to the assertions made by advocates of melting-point
laws, cheaper guns are more likely to be identifiable than their costlier
counterparts simply because the more expensive guns have fewer irregularities, and the irregularities which do exist are more permanent
due to the hardness of the alloys. 24 While some may contend that this
is irrelevant, since the inferior metal used in the cheaper guns causes
the irregularities to ultimately "wear off' after repeated use (e.g., a
nick in the bore of the gun may disappear after repeated firings), this
argument loses its persuasive appeal when one considers that the
cheaper guns will rarely, if ever, be fired, since they are not intended
to be used for sport or for target practice. 25 Additionally, since the
cheap Saturday Night Specials have a higher rate of cylinder misalignment, it is more likely that the bullet will retain a "misalignment
26
mark" after it has exited the barrel.
Another argument that proponents of melting-point laws advance
is that it is easier to file off the serial numbers on guns made of softer
alloy. 27 This matter is scarcely worth considering. Although filing off

the serial number of a "cheaper" handgun may take a few minutes less
than filing the numbers off of a handgun made of a harder alloy, it
does not require any additional tools, and is just as simple an undertaking. 28 More importantly, however, filing the serial numbers off of
cheaper handguns is not common criminal procedure for two important reasons: First, it is a dead giveaway to law enforcement that the
carrier of the handgun is likely involved in criminal activity, thereby
calling much unwanted police attention to that individual; 29 second,
21 Id.
22 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, HANDBOOK OF FoRNSIC SCIENCE 52

(1992).

23 Kapelsohn, supra note 20.
24 Id.

25 Id.
26 This is because, as the bullet enters the rear of the barrel, it is slightly off-center,
thereby causing a part of it to be shaved off. Telephone Interview with Richard W. Chenow, Firearms Examiner for the Chicago Police Crime Laboratory (Sept. 5, 1994).
27 See Fennell, supra note 7, at 58 (citing Cook, supra note 1, at 1740). See also Kelley v.
R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153 n.9 (Md. 1985) ("Generally, the weapon is manufactured from soft, inexpensive metal. As a result, serial numbers are easily and sometimes
completely erased by either filing or melting.").
28 Kapelsohn, supra note 20.
29 Id
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filing the serial number off of a gun is a federal offense,30 and virtually
every state's law criminalizes possession of a firearm without a serial
number.3 '
Placing even more doubt on the premise that guns the meltingpoint laws might remove from the market are harder to trace ballistically, experts feel that cheaper handguns generally allow more
primer residue to escape the cylinder after the handgun has been
fired, thereby making it easier for forensics experts to identify this
residue on the shooter's hand.3 2 When a person discharges a firearm,
primer residue may be deposited on the person's hand in varying
amounts. Forensics experts then test for the presence of antimony,
33
barium, -and lead-components of most primer mixtures.
The "cylinder gap," which separates the front of the handgun cylinder from the rear of the barrel, is usually anywhere from four to
nine one-thousandths of an inch wide.4 Poorly-made guns tend to
have a longer gap, thus allowing slightly more residue to escape.3 5
Therefore, it appears that using a cheaper handgun in a crime will
actually increase the criminal's likelihood of being linked to a particular shooting via a forensic examination.
c.

PREMISE 3: MELTINC-POINT LAWS TAKE HANDGUNS OFF THE MARKET
AND THEREBY REDUCE CRIMINALS' ACCESS TO FIREARMS

Some gun control advocates have argued that the mere access to
guns makes people more likely to commit crimes, because the access
to guns causes otherwise law-abiding people to murder in a moment
of ungovernable anger or because criminals are facilitated by access to
handguns or both.3 6 Access to handguns, however, does not turn lawabiding citizens into murderers. Professors James Wright and Peter
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1988).
31 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.270(a) (1989); 720 ILCS 5/24-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-18 (West 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.7 (West 1943); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.230 (West 1991); NEv. REv. STAT. § 202.277 (1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1550(a) (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6117(b) (1994).
32 Kapelsohn, supranote 20.
33 FEDERAL Bu.EAu OF INVESnGAnON, supra note 22, at 56.
34 Kapelsohn, supra note 20.
35 Id.

36 See generally Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CrN. L. REv.
1103, 1113-23 (1991) (discussing a variety of arguments counselling against firearms own-

ership, including the issue of increased danger of homicides committed while the perpetrator was in a "blind rage," and the increased criminality due to accessibility of firearms);
Markus Boser, Comment, Go Ahead, State, Make Them Pay: An Analysis of Washington D.C.'s
Assault Weapon ManufacturingStrict Liability Act, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 313, 318
(1992) ("There can be little doubt that widespread availability of firearms is a significant
factor in explaining the prevalence of violent crime in the United States.").
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Rossi from the University of Massachusetts performed what is considered the most complete empirical study on the relationship between
guns and crime under a three-year grant from the United States Department of Justice.3 7 After surveying all of the studies and criminological data that had been developed as of 1980, their conclusions
were as follows:
There appear to be no strong causal connections between private gun
ownership and the crime rate.... There is no compelling evidence that

private weaponry is an important cause of... violent criminality. It is
commonly hypothesized that much criminal violence, especially homicide, occurs simply because the means of lethal violence (firearms) are
readily at hand, and thus, that much homicide would not occur were
available. There is no persuasive evidence that
firearms generally 3less
8
supports this view.
Murder rates in "gun controlled" areas, such as Mexico and
South Africa, are more than twice as high as those in the United
States.3 9 Conversely, countries such as Switzerland, New Zealand, and
Israel, which have household gun ownership rates comparable to
those in the United States, have much lower rates of crime and
violence. 40
In the case of Switzerland, for example, military service for males
is compulsory, and according to the Federal Constitution of 1874, all
military servicemen receive arms (most commonly "assault weapons") .41 As soon as the government adopts a new infantry rifle, it sells
the old ones to the public. 42 As a result, a nation of only six million
people has at least two million guns, including over 600,000 fully automatic assault rifles (more than in the United States) and 500,000 pistols. 43 Even without a strict registration scheme, the Swiss homicide

37 WRIGHT & Rossi, supra, note 14.
38 Id. at 1-2 of the Abstract. See also Boser, supranote 36, at 319 (" [I] t is difficult to find

proof that gun availability causes violent crime."); Gary Kleck, Policy Lessonsfrom Recent Gun
Control Research, 49 LAw & CoNTrmp. PROBS. 35, 39 (1986) ("[N]o reliable evidence indicates that guns have net assault-instigating effects, or that aggression-eliciting effects are
anymore common than inhibiting effects. [G]uns cause some robbers to shift from one
target-type to another, without, however, increasing the frequency with which they rob.").
39 Daniel D. Polsby, The FalsePromise of Gun Control,THE ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Mar. 1994,
at 60.
40 Id. In New Zealand, where the number of guns has soared since the government
loosened controls on gun ownership in the 1980s (there are presently approximately

1,010,000 legal handguns in the nation), there has been a significant decrease in firearms
deaths and injuries (there are fewer than one hundred firearms-related robberies, homicides, and attempted homicides per year). See DAVID B. KoPEL, THE SAMuRAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE CowBoy 241-43 (1992).
41 KOPEL, supra note 40, at 282.

42 Id. at 283. Not only rifles are sold this way; the army sells anything from machine
guns and anti-tank weapons to howitzers and cannons. Id.
43 Id.
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rate is only fifteen percent of the American rate, and to the extent
that guns are used in crime, the weapon is usually a stolen pistol or
revolver. 44 The correlation between access to a firearm and criminality does not, therefore, appear to be as tautological as gun control
advocates claim.4 5 In fact, studies trying to link gun ownership to violence find either no relationship or a negative relationship, and cities
and counties with high gun ownership suffer less violence than demographically comparable areas with lower gun ownership. 46 The underlying reason for these results appears to be that criminals are
fundamentally different from non-criminals. As Don B. Kates, Jr. puts
it, "[murderers'] life histories are characterized by: often irrational
violence..., felony, mental imbalance, substance abuse, firearm and
car accidents.... 74.7% of murderers had violent felony or burglary
arrests; murderers averaged four prior major felony arrests over a
crime career of at least six years."47 These data do not even begin to
44 Id. at 286.

45 Also, it is important to note that the lower rates of homicide in other countries such
as Japan, Canada, Australia, Germany, and Britain are not a result of gun-control legislation, but instead are attributable to the much more pervasive social controls which underlie those societies. Id. In Australia, for example, the rate of robbery arrests is similar to
that of the United States (20-80%). However, the conviction rate is much higher than in
the United States (around 94%). Id. at 215. With regard to social controls, David Kopel
states:
Interestingly, in the nations with the strongest social controls-Switzerland and Japan-the homicide rate is near zero, and the suicide rate is very high.... [Sluicide
and homicide are two alternative methods of dealing with fr-ustration. People socialized to cooperative or group-oriented behavior are more likely to choose suicide over
homicide.
Id. at 409. Taking a more holistic approach, Charles Silberman notes that "American
crime is an outgrowth of the greatest strengths and virtues of American society-its openness, its ethos of equality, its heterogeneity-as well as its greatest vices, such as the long
heritage of racial hatred and oppression."

CHAR.Es E. SnBERMAN, CRnMNAL VIOLENCe,

86 (1978).
46 See, e.g., Douglas L Murray, Handguns, Gun ControlLaws and FirearmsViolence, 23 Soc.
PROBS. 81, 91-92 (1975); Gary Kleck, The RelationshipBetween Gun Ownership Levels and Rates
of Violence in the United States, in FhtEAus Am VIoLENCE 99 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984);
David McDowall, Gun Availability and Robbery Rates: A Panel Study of Large U.S. Cities, 19741978, 8 LAw & PoL'Y 135 (1986); Gary Kleck & E. Britt Paterson, The Impact of Gun Control
CRIMINALJUSrICE

and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9J. QUANITATVE CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).

47 Don B. Kates, Jr. et af., A Critique of CommonJustifications For Banning Handguns,
October 22, 1992 draft (on file with author) (citingCmcAGo PoLc DEP'T, MURDER ANALYsis, 1966-1991). See alsoBRENDAN F.J. FuYnsH & Dwirr H. SMALL, THE MOUNTING THREAT
OF HoME INTRUDFxns 53-54 (1993) ("The Vpical murderer has a prior criminal history extending over at least six years."); Kates, supranote 17, at 127-28 (stating that murderers are
aberrant individuals who show a consistent indifference to human life, including their
own); David B. Kopel, PerilorProtection? The Risks and Benefits of HandgunProhibition,12 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. Rxv. 285, 324 (1993) (asserting that "two-thirds to four-fifths of homicide
offenders have arrest records, frequently for violent felonies.") [hereinafter Peril or Protection?];Kleck, supranote 38, at 40-41 (70-75% of domestic homicide offenders have a previous arrest, and about half have a previous conviction); David B. Kopel, Trust the People: The
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comprise the full extent of murderers' prior criminal careers-and
thus how different murderers are from the ordinary law-abiding person. Much serious crime goes unreported. Of those crimes that are
reported, a large number are never cleared by arrest; and many of
those cleared by arrest are juvenile arrests that are not included in the
data recounted above. 48 Therefore, the argument that the access to a
gun during a time of stress or of anger will cause law-abiding persons
to become murderers lacks persuasive power.
Turning to the question of whether access to guns facilitates criminal activity, melting-point laws are purportedly based on a desire to
limit the access of handguns to criminals and, thereby, reduce criminality.49 First, evidence suggests that Saturday Night Specials are not
used more than other types of handguns for criminal activity, 50 since
criminals, for obvious reasons, want high-quality guns.
Implicit in the melting-point legislation is the argument that regulations upon legitimate gun purchases will reduce the availability of
guns for illegal purposes. This argument, however, assumes that the
domestic market is the only source for guns, and that if the domestic
market dried up, guns would no longer be available. Unfortunately,
this assumption appears to be wrong. As an illustration of how easily
criminals can access guns, regardless of governmental restrictions on
gun sales, it is estimated that as many as 500,000 Chinese-made AK-47
"assault rifles" were illegally smuggled into the United States between
1986 and 1989.51 Unlike the islands of Japan and Britain, where the
police forces are large in relation to the overall population, 52 where
Case Against Gun Contro4 3J. ON FIREARMS AND PUB.POL'y 77, 83 (1990) (discussing studies
which have shown that two-thirds to four-fifths of homicide offenders have prior arrest
records); Gary KIeck & DavidJ. Bordua, The FactualFoundationfor Certain Key Assumptions of

Gun Contro 5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 271 (1983) (estimating that three-fourths of domestic homicide offenders have been previously arrested for some assaultive crime, half have been

convicted, and 90% have been the cause of at least one disturbance report to the police);
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MIcH. L. Ruv. 204, 266 (1983) (finding that a "substantial majority" of murderers have
prior felony convictions) [hereinafter Handgun Prohibition).
48 Due to expungement statutes and the like. See generay T. Markus Funk & Daniel D.
Polsby, Prior Indiscretions: The Questionable Efficacy of ExpungingJuvenile Records (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
49 See Cook, supra note 1, at 1740.
50 Chenow, supra note 26; Kleck, supra note 16, at 44.
51 Gregory Inskip, Our Right to BearArms, 8-WTR Del. Law. 21, 24 (1991). See also Gary
S. Becker, Stiffer Jail Terms Will Make Gunmen More Gun-Shy, BUSINEss WEEK,February 28,
1994, at 18 ("Guns continue to be smuggled onto the illegal market from abroad, from
military stock, and from crooked gun dealers."); Robert Friedman & Barry Meier, FarBeyond Law's Controls,NFwsoAY, July 31, 1988, at 5 (arguing that if drug dealers can penetrate
United States borders and reap millions of dollars in illegal profits, they will arm themselves accordingly).
52 See KOPEL, supra note 40, at 96.
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the absence of long-lasting wars has eliminated a comm6n source of
illegal weapons acquisitions, 53 and where civil liberties are not
guarded as jealously as in the United States, 54 it is implausible to expect the United States Government to effectively restrict gun
ownership.
What makes it even more unlikely that the United States government will be able to control the access to handguns is the reality that
even the law-abiding population resists gun control; the use of severe
mandatory sentences for gun control violations is merely a reflection
of the unwillingness of the citizenry to have'their right to self-preservation taken away by the government.55 A 1977 study conducted in Illinois, for example, revealed that only twenty-five percent of handgun
owners complied with registration, 56 and a 1979 survey revealed
that seventy-three percent would not comply with handgun prohibition.5 7 Professors Brendan Furnish and Dwight Small noted that
"[a] larmingly, what gun laws have accomplished is to create an entire
class of new criminals-normally honest, law-abiding citizens who
elect to keep a gun in full knowledge that they are in violation of
certain local and state laws."5 8 The reality is that even the most Draconian measures could not hope to remove guns from the hands of people who were determined to get and keep them. 59
At bottom, criminals generally obtain their guns in one of two
ways: They either steal them, 60 or they buy them on the black market 6l-either way, the guns are untraceable. 62 The Department of'Jus53 Id.
54
55
56

Id. at 98-106.
Id. at 164.
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun ControLk ProhibitionRevisited,

INQUIRY,

Dec. 5, 1977, 20,

n.1.
57 Peril or Protedion?,supra note 47, at 322.

58 FURNISH & SMALL, supra note 47, at 216.
59 Ted R. Gurr, The History of Viwlent Cime in America; An Overview, in 1 VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 17 (Ted R. Gurr ed., 1989). See also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: DrugProhibition
and the Weakness ofPublicPolicy, 103 YALE LJ. 2593, 2616.17 (1994) (discussing why prohibitions on both drugs and guns will fail).
60 See generallyJAMES D. WRIGr ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 315 (1983) (describing theft as one of the "marketing mechanisms" in
the circulation of weapons).
61 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAsURY, BuREAu OF ALCOHOL, ToBAccO, AND FIREARMS,
PROTECTING AMERICA: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL STATUTE 26

(1992) (estimating that 37% of firearms acquired by criminals have been bought or traded
on the black market). See also KoPsL, supra note 40, at 416. Even in countries which have
strict handgun laws such as Japan and Britain, criminals can purchase handguns on the
black market with relative ease. Id. at 287.
62 Telephone Interview with Sergeant David Lindman, Minneapolis Police Department
Identification Unit, Minneapolis, Minn. (Nov. 11, 1998). There are also studies which
show that felons generally obtain their weapons through unlicensed and unregulated
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tice and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms have estimated
that ninety percent of violent crimes are committed without handguns, but of those crimes which are committed with handguns, ninetythree percent of the guns used in those crimes are obtained through
63
unlawful,purchases.
Even given the hypothetical situation where the United States
borders are effectively closed off to gun smugglers and there are no
legal gun sales, criminals would still make guns and purchase them on
the black market. During the wars in Southeast and Southwest Asia,
for example, local artisans produced, from scratch, AK-47 replicas in
their "makeshift backyard foundries."64 But it is not necessary to go to
Asia to find people capable of developing a gun-manufacturing cottage industry; Americans are clearly able to produce their own arms.
"Investment casting," for one, is a low-cost method of producing parts
which have complex shapes, and it is presently widely used by hobby65
ists.
Moreover, a lathe, milling-machine, grinder, drill press, and a
complement of hand tools are the only requirements for opening a
modest gun-manufacturing shop. 66 Pakistani and Afghan peasants,
for example, have manufactured firearms capable of firing Russian
AK-47 cartridges with the aid of wood fires and the simplest hand
tools, so it should come as no surprise that a 1986 government study
revealed that a full one-fifth of all guns seized by the police in Washington D.C. were homemade. 67 Of course, policing such a cottage
industry would be impossible-even in the highly supervised environment of a prison, crude but effective firearms are continually produced and are readily available. 68
Further, criminals with guns are often less dangerous to their victims than criminals with alternative weapons. Robbers with guns are
less likely to physically attack their victims than are robbers armed
with other weapons or no weapons at all.69 Also, the availability of

handguns appears to have no measurable effect upon the robbery
rates in the larger cities, except that the criminals tend to shift their
channels (i.e., from "friends" and "from family members"), and not necessarily from those
engaged in illegal gun selling. KLEcR, supra note 16, at 46.
63 Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113 PUB. INTERErST 40, 46 (1993).
64 See Polsby, supra note 39, at 64.
65 John G. Frey, Tooling for Economical Investment Casting, TOOL AND MANUFACTURING
ENGINEER, February 1969, at 47.
66 Charles H. Chandler, Gun-Makingas a CottageIndusty, 3J. ON FiRFARMs & PUB. POL'v
155, 160 (1990).
67 David B. Kopel, Trust the People: The CaseAgainst Gun Control, 3J. ON FIREARMS & PUB.
POL'Y 77, 81 (1990).

68 Id. See also Lee H. Bowker, Victimizers and Victims in American CorrectionalInstitutions,
in THE PAINS OF IMPpISONMENT 63, 64 (RobertJohnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982).
69 See KIeck, supranote 38, at 37. See also infra notes 194 to 195 and accompanying text
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interest from weaker and more vulnerable targets (including women
and the elderly) to stronger and more lucrative targets (such as banks,
other commercial institutions, and men) once they obtain a gun. 70 In
argument, from a criminal's standpoint, buying a gun legally would be
unwise because the criminal has little interest in later being traced to
the gun.
The law enforcement community is acutely aware of this state of
affairs. In 1995, the National Association of Chiefs of Police polled
the nations 18,000+ police agencies. 7 1 Of the respondents, 88.7%
believed that banning all firearms would not reduce the ability of
criminals to obtain firearms and 90.4% felt that law-abiding citizens
should be able to purchase any legal firearm for either sport or selfdefense; and 97.4% of the responding Chiefs of Police agreed that
even if Congress approved a ban on all rifles, shotguns, and handguns, criminals would still be able to obtain "illegal weapons." 72 Two
of the nation's most distinguished law enforcement organizations also
share these views-both the American Federation of Police and the
National Police Officers Association of America are on record favoring private gun ownership. 73 Therefore, one of the prime justifications for melting-point laws-that limiting the legal access to guns will
significantly reduce crime committed for personal financial gain-appears to be undermined.
Having heard the arguments for and against melting-point laws, it
is now fitting to conduct a brief examination of the much-debated
historical, legal, and philosophical foundation of the right to bear
arms in the United States. This will provide an understanding for why
Americans seem to profoundly resist gun control measures such as the
melting-point laws, 7 4 and will shed some light on why this resistance
may, historically at least, be justified.
70

Kleck, supra note 38, at 37.

71 NATIONAL ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, 7TH NATIONAL SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEmENT

OFFCERS IN THE UNrTED STATES 2 (1995).
72 Id.
73 FURNISH & SMALL, supra note 47, at 60.
74 See, e.g., WRmGHT Ex AL., supra note 60, at 1-2 ("The Gun may not constitute the very

heart of American culture and civilization, but it is assuredly an important component.");
FRANKuN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 68-69

(1987) ("It would be idle to deny that firearms ownership in the United States has been a
feature of the American tradition."); Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, 21 AM.
HEaRIAGE 4 (1970) ("[T]he United States is the only modem industrial urban nation that
persists in maintaining a gun culture. It is the only industrial nation in which the possession of rifles, shotguns, and handguns is lawfully prevalent among large numbers of its
population."); Nicholas J.Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to
Arms Vrewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 1, 10 (1992) (discussing Americans' "almost spiritual attachment" to firearms).
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BEAR

ARMS, AND THE

USE OF THE TERM "MILrrIA"

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." 75 Heated exchanges have arisen concerning the meaning
of these words. Examinations of the original meaning of the Amendment have focused primarily on the implication of the phrase "[a]
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State
...

."

Some commentators view the phrase as a statement of purpose

and maintain that the Second Amendment provides individual citizens the right to keep and bear arms; 76 others regard the Second
Amendment as creating an exclusively collective right for the states to
77
maintain organized military forces.
Those who favor the collective rights approach focus almost
solely on the textual reference to a "well regulated Militia," which they
view as a linguistic preamble that restricts the right to keep and bear
arms. 78 Their contention, therefore, is that the right to keep and bear
arms is restricted to officially recognized military units.7 9 This interpretation arguably ignores the plain language of the Constitution.8 0
75 U.S. CONST. amend. II.

76 The view is known as the "individual right" interpretation. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTIrUIONAL RIGHT (1984);
JOYcE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994); David I. Caplan, The Right of the
Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DEr. C.L. REv. 789; Handgun Prohibition, supra note 47, at 206; Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE
LJ. 637 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the PersonalRight to Bear
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994).
77 This view is known as the "collective right" interpretation. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 139-47; Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and
Meaningof the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am.HIST. 22, 42 (1984); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis
A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen yourMilitia Lately,
15 U. DAyrON L. REv. 5 (1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAt U. L.REv. 107 (1991); Roy G. Weatherup, StandingArmies and Armed Citizens:
An HistoricalAnalysis of The Second Amendment, 2 HAsrINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975).
78 See, e.g., Peter B. Feller & Karl L.Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61
Nw. U. L.REv. 46, 67-70 (1966) ("[T]he ideal of the supremacy of state militia over federal
military power is a fading echo. The second amendment as the embodiment of that ideal
is therefore obsolete."); M. Truman Hunt, Note, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacfier?, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 751, 757 (stressing Court's emphasis on well-regulated militia as lending support to collective rights interpretation of Second Amendment).
79 See, e.g., Maynard H. Jackson,Jr., Handgun Controk Constitutionaland CriticallyNeeded,
8 N.C. CENT. LJ. 189, 196 (1977). See also United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320
(8th Cir. 1988) (interpreting the Second Amendment purely in terms of protecting state
militia, rather than individual rights); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1974) ("[T]he Second Amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing
arms.").
80 For a historically-based analysis, see Levinson, supra note 76, at 649-51; David T.
Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiographyof the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL 1
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In the eighteenth century, the term "militia" rarely referred to
organized military units, but instead was a term which included all
citizens who qualified for military service. 81 Since the militia was comprised of "the able-bodied men in the township or county" who
elected their own officers,8 2 the government did not tax the populace
to buy guns. Instead, the states required the citizens to own and carry
their own guns for militia duty.8 3 Even today, the definition that is
included in the United States Code states that:
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least
17 years of age and... under 45 years of age who are, or who have made
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and
female citizens of the United States who are members of the National
Guard.84
The Bill of Rights, which naturally includes the Second Amendment,, was added due to "anti-federalist protests."85 In particular, the
anti-federalists were concerned that the government would use its
control over the militia to "prevent popular rebellion against tyranny."86 At the Virginia ratifying convention, George Mason warned
that the government could "gradually increase its power 'by totally disusing and neglecting the militia,'" 8 7 and Patrick Henry repeated this
fear, stating that "[t]he militia, sir, is our ultimate safety ....

The

great object is that every man be armed... everyone who is able may
have a gun."88 Thus, the collectivist reading of the Second Amendment seems to ignore the historical context of the amendment's
enactment.
Further casting doubt upon the collective rights contention that
"militia" refers only to governmentally organized military units, the
Second Amendment does not mention the right of the states to regu(1987); Handgun Prohibition, supra note 47, at 211-43.
81 In defining the "militia" after the passage of the Second Amendment, Congress referred to the "whole militarily qualified citizenry and required that every member of this
group possess his own firearm." Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, PoliticalLiberty, and
the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L REV. 103, 106 n.6 (1987) (citing First Militia Act, 1
Stat. 271 (1792)).
82 See KoPEIL, supranote 40, at 311. In fact, the whole Prussian notion of military duty
was absolutely foreign to the American militiamen. The English commander at Louisburg
complained that the American militiamen "have the highest notions of the Rights, and
Libertys... and indeed are almost Levellers, they must know when, how, and what service
they are going upon, and be treated in a manner that few Military Bred Gentlemen would
condescend to...." DOUGLAS EDWARD LEACH, ROOTS OF CONFLiT. BRIsIH ARMED FORCES
AND COLONIAL AMERicANs, 1677-1763, at 69 (1986).

KoPEL, supranote 40, at 311-12.
84 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1993).
85 See KOPEL, supranote 40, at 319.
83

86 Id.
87

Id.

88 Id.
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late the militia.8 9 Instead, it expressly protects the "right of the people" to keep and bear arms. 90 As with the First and Fourth
Amendments, the phrase "right of the people" arguably protects the
people from the government and not visa versa. 9 1
As Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas McIntyre Cooley
wrote in his GeneralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw in 1898:
[I]f the right were limited to those enrolled [by the government in the
militia], the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by
the action or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in
check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people,
from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and
bear arms,
and they need no permission or regulation of law for the
92
purpose.
In striking down a gun control law, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in State v. Kerner,described the right to keep and bear arms
as "a sacred right, based upon the experience of the ages in order that
the people may be accustomed to bear arms and ready to use them for
protection of their liberties or their country when occasion serves." 93
The court considered the right to bear arms a right of "[t] he ordinary
private citizen" as it was "the common people, ... . accustomed to the
94
use of arms," who had fought and won the revolution.
Therefore, Kerner appears to support the proposition that the
right to bear arms does not depend on the organized militia but, instead, exists in large part to provide people a defense against such organized militias: "In our own State, in 1870, when Kirk's militia was
turned loose and the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, it would
have been fatal if our people had been deprived of the right to bear
arms, and had been unable to oppose an effective front to the usurpation." 95 Defense by the militia means civil defense, not defense by
89 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("[Since] all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States....
States cannot... prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms ...
90 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
91 See EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, A CONTINUING AMERICAN

12 (1985) (considering possibility that Second Amendment was intended to protect individual right to bear arms); MALcoLM,supranote 76, at 162 ("[The] idiosyncratic
definition [advanced by the collectivists] flounders because it cannot be reasonably applied to the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, where reference is also made to
the right of 'the people'."); David L. Faigman, Reconciling IndividualRights and Government
Interests: MadisonianPrinciplesversus Supreme CourtPractice,78 VA. L.REv. 1521, 1522 (1992)
(arguing that spheres protected by Bill of Rights "should not be the subject of majoritarian
definition"). See also Levinson, supra note 76, at 652-54.
DILEMMA

92 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTrImoNAL LAw 298 (1898).

93 107 S.E. 222, 223 (N.C. 1921), cited in Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism,
2 GEO. MASON U. Cw. RTs. L.J. 67, 89 (1991).

94 Id. at 224, cited in Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 93.
95 Id. See also Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 90 (discussing disarming of citizens by gov-
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organized military units under the control of the State, 9 6 and the collectivist assertion that the term "militia" refers purely to military units,
therefore, appears to lack foundation. As English History Professor
Joyce Malcolm points out
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals,
each perceived as crucial to the maintenance of liberty. First, it was
meant to guarantee the individual's right to have arms for self-defence
and self-preservation ....

This is... plain from American colonial prac-

tice, the debates over the Constitution, and state proposals for what was
to become the Second Amendment.... The second and related objective concerned the militia ....
The argument that today's National
Guardsmen, members of a select militia, would constitute the only9 7persons entitled to keep and bear arms has no historical foundation.
It therefore seems that equating "right of the people" with "right
of the state" would require considerable stretching of the Constitution's meaning. 98 While the Second Amendment apparently protects
the citizens' right to keep and bear arms, its language indicates that
this is a private right protected for the sake of the public good. 99
IV. Tim

SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO

BEAR ARMs

The Supreme Court did not have an occasion to render a thorough interpretation of the Second Amendment until the twentieth
century.' 0 0 Until then, the federal government did not regulate firearms, the Bill of Rights was not yet applied to the states, and the Court
only occasionally made reference to the Second Amendment.' 0 '
It was during the Prohibition Era that the Court first took a closer
look at the Second Amendment. 0 2 Certain weapons, such as "tommy
ernments of both Nazi Germany and South Africa); Letterfrom the FederalFarmerto the Republican No. XVII (Jan. 25, 1788), in LErrERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN

124 (William H. Bennett ed., 1978) (the Federal Farmer believed that the general populace needed to possess arms to avoid the formation of a select body of military men, against
which the populace would be defenseless).
96 Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun ControlLegislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent is There an IndividualRight to Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 Viii. L. REv.
1407, 1426 (1992).
97 MALcoLM, supra note

76, at 162-63.

98 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 ("'[T]he people' protected
by the... Second Amendment[ ] ... refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community."), rehg nied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990); Lund, supranote
81, at 107.
99 See Lund, supra note 81, at 111.
100 See id. at 108; MichaelJ. Quinlan, Is there a NeutralJustificationforRefusing to Implement
the Second Amendment or is the Supreme CourtJust "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 641, 677
(1993).
101 Lund, supra note 81, at 108.
102 Id. at 109.
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guns" and sawed-off shotguns, became associated with "gangsters" during this time, and therefore became the targets of legislative action.' 03
In part to combat the use of these weapons, Congress passed the National Firearms Act of 1934, which prohibited the private possession of
04
specified weapons.'
After a district court dismissed an indictment under the Act for
violating the Second Amendment, 0 5 the Supreme Court for the first
time rendered a detailed interpretation of the Second Amendment in
United States v. Miller.10 6 The defendants in Millerwere charged under
the Act for possessing a sawed-off shotgun. After the Supreme Court
reviewed the lower court's decision, the Court decided to reinstate the
indictments and pointed out that the weapon involved in this case
lacked "[s]ome reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia" 0 7 and that "its use could [not] contribute to the common defense."' 0 8 On its face, this holding appears
to support the collectivist argument that the Second Amendment creates an exclusive collection of rights for states to maintain organized
military forces. 10 9 The Court's decision in Miller is subject to several
103 See LEE KENNETT"& JAMES L ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA; THE ORIGINS OF A

202-04 (1975).
104 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (1988). The National Firearms Act of 1934 states in pertinent part
that:
(a) The term "firearm" means a shotgun or rifle having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length, or any other weapon, except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is
discharged by an explosive if such weapon is capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun, and includes a muffler or silencer for any firearm whether or
not such firearm is included within the foregoing definition.

NATIONAL DIMrMmA

Sec. 3. (a) There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon firearms transferred in the
continental United States a tax at the rate of $200 for each firearm ....
Sec. 5. (a) Within sixty days after the effective date of this Act every person possessing
a firearm shall register, with the collector of the district in which he resides, the
number or other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name, address,
place where such firearm is usually kept, and place of business or employment ....
Id. § 5845.
105 United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939) (holding that the demurrer should be sustained because the National Firearms Act of 1934 provision prohibiting
delivery of firearms in interstate commerce without a stamp-affixed order was a violation of
the constitutional amendment providing the right of the people to keep and bear arms).
106 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The Supreme Court, in dicta, twice has cited the holding in
Miller with approval. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972).
107 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
108 Id.
109 SeeJackson, supra note 79, at 196 (pointing to Court's reasoning in prohibiting the
use of a sawed-off shotgun because the weapon does not contribute to effectiveness of
militia as support for collective rights interpretation). See also Wagner, supra note 96, at
1412 n.30 ("The Court apparently felt that the purpose of the militia was limited to defense
[sic] of the nation against insurrection and foreign invasion.").
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criticisms, however, and in the end it arguably lends support to the
individual rights argument. 110
One of this holding's infirmities is that the defendants disappeared following the dismissal of their indictments and, therefore, did
not brief their side of the argument before the Court."' Some commentators contend that this deprived the Court of the opportunity to
thoroughly examine both sides of the issue and, therefore, may have
influenced the outcome of the case. 1 2 Further, certain commentators interpret the holding in Miller to merely stand for the proposition
that "it is not within judicial notice that [a sawed-off shotgun] is any
part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." 113 This proposition is empirically incorrect, however, as it has been demonstrated that sawed-off shotguns
114
were (and are) commonly used military weapons.
Moreover, the reasoning in Miller appears to be incomplete in
light of the strange results that would follow adherence to it. The
Court in Millerseemed to be saying that precisely those weapons considered most superfluous for self-defense purposes (military weaponry) deserve constitutional protection. 115 But the Court could not
have intended to outlaw all non-military firearms, while allowing private citizens to own weapons designed solely for military application. 1 6 Few weapons, after all, could be more useful in a military
context than a bazooka or a portable rocket-launcher, but these surely
could not have been the types of weapons the Court intended to sanc1 17
tion for private use.
110 Lund, supra note 81, at 110.
III Id. at 109.
112 See id. (emphasizing lack of evidence, defendant's failure to brief the other side of
the argument, and defendant's disappearance following trial court's decision to dismiss as
contributing to defendant's loss); Robert Dowlut, Federaland State ConstitutionalGuarantees
to Arms, 15 U. DAYrON L. REV. 59, 73-88 (1989) (arguing that Millerwas defective because
the Court only considered Government's view).
113 Lund, supra note 81, at 109 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
114 See id. (citing Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) ("[I]n the so
called 'Commando Units' some sort of military use seems to have been found for almost
any modern lethal weapon. In view of this, if the rule of the Miller case is general and
complete, the result would follow that, under present day conditions, the federal government would be empowered only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a
flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus."), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943)).
115 See id.
116 See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.) ("If the logical extension of
the defendant's argument for the holding of Miller was inconceivable in 1942, it is completely irrational in this time of nuclear weapons."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
117 Id. See also Cases, 131 F.2d at 922. The Court in Cases noted that
[a]nother objection to the rule of the Miller case as a full and general statement is
that according to it Congress would be prevented by the Second Amendment from
regulating the possession or use by private persons not present or prospective mem-

T. MARKUS FUNK

. [Vol. 85

Lastly, if the Court's holding in Millerdid protect only the guns of
the National Guard or organized state militias, as many advocates of
the states' right theory claim, then the Court would have disposed of
the appeal on standing alone. The Court, in effect, would have held
that, since the accused were not protected by the Amendment, they
did not have standing to challenge the law. Instead, the Court in
Millerrecognized that the accused, as individuals, did have standing to
invoke the Amendment, and the Court dealt with the challenge on its
merits. Moreover, nothing in the holding on the merits focuses on
whether the accused were within the Amendment; the holding instead
focused on whether the weapon was within the Amendment. Noting
that the Second Amendment's stated purpose is the militia,11 8 the
Court held that only military-type and militarily useful weapons were
within the Amendment. Having set out these general guidelines, the
Court found itself unable to apply them to determine whether the
specific weapon type involved in Millerwas within the Amendment.
Even with all its shortcomings, the holding in Miller does, in the
end, seem to support the proposition that the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms.11 9
[The historical sources] show plainly enough that the Militia comprised
all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.... And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men

were expected to appear bearing
arms supplied by themselves and of the kind
120
in common use at the time.
In 1990, the constitutional argument against laws that restrict gun
ownership was strengthened by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.12 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, observed that the phrase "the people" occurs several
times in the Bill of Rights, specifically the Second Amendment's "right
of the people to keep and bear Arms," the First Amendment's "right
of the people peaceably to assemble," and the Fourth Amendment's
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
bers of any military unit, of distinctly military arms, such as machine guns, trench
mortars, anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns ....
Id. See alsoJacob Sullum, Devaluing the 2d Amendmen4 Cm.Tam., May 7, 1991, at 23 (claim-

ing that under the Miller test, weapons such as assault rifles and machine guns are clearly
covered by the Second Amendment).
118 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
119 Lund, supra note 81, at 110.

120 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added), cited in Lund, supra note 81, at 110. See also
Wagner, supra note 96, at 1414 (arguing that the collectivist position is not supported by
the Miller opinion, which states that civilians themselves, and not the states, would supply
arms used by the militia).
121 494 U.S. 259, reh'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990).
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effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." 22 In each of
these instances, the Court said, the phrase "the people" was used as a
"term of art" in select parts of the Constitution that referred to individ123
ual Americans.
Miller and Verdugo dealt with only federal law, and the Supreme
Court has never ruled on any of the roughly twenty-thousand state
and local gun laws. 124 Even though the collective rights theory arguably has neither strong historical support, nor precedential authority,
the lower courts for the most part have upheld gun control laws
against Second Amendment challenges. 125
V.

THE RIGHT TO

BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-PRESERVATION

While the foregoing Second Amendment analysis suggests that
the right to keep and bear arms is designed at least in part to offer
protection against potential political oppression, few seriously argue
that this is the primary reason that the modem civilian wants to own a
handgun or rifle. The real reason that people want handguns is undoubtedly for self-defense. 12 6 And given that people are committing
crimes against other persons with a violence that is unprecedented in
modem world history, 12 7 this appears understandable.
Each day, approximately 16,000 United States citizens are victims
of violent crimes. 12 8 In response to this high rate of crime, every fortyeight seconds an American uses a handgun for defense against an attacker. 12 9 In fact, studies indicate that seventy-eight percent of Americans declared themselves willing to use a gun for self-defense.' 3 0
Thus, the fundamental reason many Americans (non-criminals, at
least) desire access to firearms seems to be to protect themselves
122 Id. at 264-65.

See id. at 265.
124 See Lund, supra note 81, at 110. See also GEORGE D. NEwrON, JR. & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, Fnt.Atm§ & VIOLENCE INAMERICAN LIFE 113,253-62 (1969); LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTiONAL LAw 226 n.6 (1978).
125 See, e.g., Burton v. Sills, 240 A.2d 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (holding that
gun control law requiring issuance of identification cards was proper and reasonable exercise of state's police powers).
126 The surge in gun sales following the riots in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating case seems to confirm this. See Egan, supra note 14, at Al. See also NATIONAL INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTiCE, SOURCEBOOK OF CIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 244
(1993) (estimating that one-half of the existing stock of handguns are owned purely for selfdefense purposes).
127 FURNISH & SMALL, supra note 47, at 7.
128 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 126, at 244.
129 David B. Kopel, Hold Your Fire: Gun Control Won't Stop Rising Violenc POL'Y REv.,
Winter 1993, at 58, 60.
130 Don B. Kates,Jr., Bigotry, Symbolism andIdeology in the Battle over Gun Contro4 1992 PUB.
INTEREST L. REv. 31, 44; Kleck, supra note 16, at 111.
123
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against criminal violence-violence which the government appears
3
unable to control.' '
Consider that a twelve-year-old child has an eighty-three percent
chance of being the victim of a violent crime in his or her lifetime and
a fifty-two percent chance of being victimized twice.' 3 2 How does the
criminal justice system respond to such startling figures? In cities such
as New York, a person arrested for committing a felony has a mere one
percent chance of serving time in state prison. 133 Thus, it should come
as no surprise that police chiefs admit that they are unable to protect
the citizens all of the time and that, as a result, they support civilian
firearms possession. 5 4 Department ofJustice Statistics for 1991 show
that, for all crimes of violence, the police are able to respond within
five minutes only twenty-eight percent of the time. 3 5 Thus, it is unreasonable to expect citizens to rely on law enforcement to protect
them when they are confronted with a violent offender.
The Second Amendment guarantees the people the right to protect themselves from a criminal threat. 3 6 Unfortunately, the Framers
did not distinguish between crimes committed by apolitical criminals
and those committed by political oppressors (whom they deemed just
another variety of criminal). 3 7 The most likely explanation for this is
that, given the frontier ethos and the rural culture that shaped the
society during those times, it did not occur to the Framers that the
government would ever question the citizens' right to defend them138
selves against the various dangers which awaited them.
131 SeJONATHAN SIMON, POOR DiscIPLINE 2 (1993) ("Scholars of penality from the right
and the left concur in the conclusion that public fear of crime is a genuine and massive
feature of our present political landscape."); FEDERAL BuREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T
OFJuSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1992, at 12, 28 (1993) (violent crime up 23% and robberies up 24% since 1988). See also KOPEL, supranote 40, at 374
("The failure or inability of the modern American state to control crime makes it particularly unlikely that Americans could be persuaded by statute to give up their guns.").
132 KoPEL, supra note 40, at 375.
133 Id.
134 See supra notes 71 to 73 and accompanying text.
135 See Snyder, supra note 63, at 43.
136 Without explicitly referring to the Second Amendment, Justice Holmes, in Patsone v.

Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914), seemed to accept the notion that the Framers
considered the individual right to repel immediate and proximate threats as basic. He
summarized that a ban on aliens' possession of long arms was permissible as a hunting
control measure, because the ban did not extend to handguns, which he said might be
needed "occasionally for self-defense." Id. See also Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69J. Am. Hisr. 599 (1982); Wagner, supra note 96, at 1449.
137 See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 87, 90, 93 (1992).
138 Id. See alsoJohnson, supra note 74, at 7-10. Whether this frontier ethos is accountable for contemporary America's attraction for guns is questionable, however. Historian W.
Eugene Hollon argues that the Western frontier was actually much more peaceful and safe
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The European emigrants who settled the United States necessarily had to learn how to use guns not only for hunting, but also for
defending against attacks from indigenous Indians, upset by the encroachment upon their land.'8 9 After the colonists secured independence from England in 1783, there was rapid expansion westward.
Since the pioneers moved faster than the government could provide
law and order, the Settlers had to protect themselves. 14 ° Thus, the
Framers may have failed to distinguish between political and personal
safety rationales for enacting the Second Amendment because they
never envisioned a need for such a distinction.
The above explanation, however, may seem unsatisfactory to
many modern students of the issue. Since objective social conditions
have changed in most parts of the country since the time of the Framers, it is necessary to analyze how the general purpose for the Second
Amendment includes self-defense. 14 1 The Framers and their philosophical contemporaries already recognized the right to personal selfdefense in their conception of the "common defense:" 42 John Locke
wrote that
[e]very one ... is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
willfully; so by the like reason when his won Preservation comes not in
competition ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away,
or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation
of the Life, the Lib43
erty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.
As heirs to an Anglo-Norman legal tradition which required free
men to keep arms for the defense of the realm and the suppression of
than contemporary society. See W. EUGENE HOLLON, FRONTIER VIOLENCE: ANOTHER LOOK
(1974). See also Don B. Kates,Jr., Toward a History ofHandgunProhibitionin the United States,
in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT i0-12 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed.,
1979); Roger D. McGrath, Treat Them to a GoodDose of Lead, CHRONICLES, January 1994, at
16.
139 See generally ROBERTJ. COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE CONsTrruTION xv (1994).
140 KOPEL, supra note 40, at 323.

141 Lund, supra note 81, at 117-18. For an argument that the Framers' intent must be
liberally construed, and that inherent in the right to bear arms to secure a well-regulated
militia was the right to self-defense, see Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the PredilectionofJudges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 65, 100-01 (1983).
142 See Lund, supranote 81, at 118. See also Wingfield v. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B.
1752) (upholding right to bear arms for diverse lawful purposes, explicitly including selfdefense).
143 JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise on Government, in Two TaTIsES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (P.
Laslett rev. ed., 1960), cited in Lund, supranote 81, at 118 n.8. See generallyTHOMAS HoBBES, LEVITHAN 66 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651) ("A Law of Nature, (Lex
Naturalis) is a Precept or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden
to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same
.... "), cited in Lund, supra note 81, at 119.
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crime, 4 4 the Founding Fathers were upholding the same philosophical tradition that had passed from Aristotle through Machiavelli to
Locke and Harrington-a tradition which deemed the possession of
arms as what distinguished a free man from a slave and which viewed
the disarming of the people as an essential device of tyranny. 14 5 Arguing that natural law could be enforced by the armed law-abiding citizen, Cicero stated:
And indeed, gentlemen, there exists a law, not written down anywhere
but inborn in our hearts; a law which comes to us not by training or
custom or reading but by derivation and absorption and adoption from
nature itself; ... I refer to the law which lays down that, if our lives are
endangered by plots or violence or armed robbers or enemies, any and
every method of protecting ourselves is morally right.. . . Indeed, even
the wisdom of the law itself by a sort of tacit implication, permits selfdefense, because it does not actually forbid men to kill; what it does,
instead, is to forbid the bearing of a weapon with the intention to kill. 146
At the time of the founding there were no organized police
forces or standing armies in the colonies. Therefore, private citizens
had to protect themselves and their families. 147 Not only were firearms commonplace, but they were, as was the case throughout much
of English history, 145 often required to be kept. 14 9 A 1639 Newport
law, for example, required that "noe man shall go two miles from the
Towne unarmed, eyther with Gunn or Sword; and that none shall
144 See HALBROOK, supra note

76, at 37-76. See alsoWALT

BERNS, IN DEFENSE OF LIBERAL

37-59 (1984) (emphasizing Framers' reliance on theories of natural right and
self-interest developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward ajurisprudenceof the Second Amendment, 9 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'y
559, 562-71 (1986) ("The concept that there is a relationship between individual ownership of weaponry and a unique status as 'free Englishmen' antedates not only the invention
of firearms but also the Norman-English legal system....").
145 Handgun Prohibition,supranote 47, at 230-35; HALBROo, supra note 76, at 7-35. See
also Kates, supranote 17, at 129 ("[L]ater thinkers from Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu, Beccarla, and the Founding Fathers on through Bishop, Pollock, Brandeis, Perkins, and beyond have deemed self defense unqualifiedly beneficial to society. It is only the
unnecessary or excessive use of force that is harmful or illegal."). See alsoFA. H
c, THE
RoAD TO SERFDOM 17 (1944) (discussing the basic individualism "inherited... from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero and Tacitus, Pericles and Thucydides" in the context of
the need to respect an individual's "tastes as supreme in his own sphere").
146 Quoted in Lance K. Stell, Guns, Politics and Reason, 3J. ON FIRARM.S & PUB. POL'Y 125,
136 (1990).
147 See Handgun Prohibition,supra note 47, at 215 n.46; Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The
Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. Lj. 589 (1991).
148 For a discussion of the historical roots of the Second Amendment, see MALcoLM,
supranote 76, at 4.
149 See Stuart R. Hays, The Right to BearArms, A Study injudicialMisinterpretation,2 WM. &
MARY L. RExv. 381, 388 (1960). See also Handgun Prohibition,supra note 47, at 214 (noting
that colonial America required every male to keep and maintain his own arms); United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 180-81 (1939) (discussing Massachusetts' organized militia,
which in 1784 required every man to be responsible for providing his own firearm).
DEMOCRACY
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come to any public Meeting without his weapon," and in 1770 the
colony of Georgia deemed it necessary "for the better security of the
inhabitants" to require every white male resident "to carry firearms to
places of public worship." 150 These examples are not surprising, given
that self-defense is at the basis of liberal theory; perhaps more basic
than the guarantees of free speech, freedom of religion, trial by jury,
and due process of law.' 5 1 As Thomas Hobbes wrote:
The right of nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his won Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment, and Reason,
hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto ....152
Liberal theorists' differing political interpretations of this right to
self-preservation notwithstanding, it seems axiomatic that the government was (and is) instituted primarily to secure individuals from
threats to their personal safety and well-being.' 5 3 Social contract theory is based upon the notion that individuals agree to give up certain
natural rights to liberty in return for political rights to better protect
their interest in self-preservation and personal prosperity through
benefits which only the state can provide. 5 4 In creating a national
government of enumerated powers subject to numerous express limitations, the Constitution outlined the specific exchange of rights and
powers. 155 The primary question, therefore, becomes whether the
government has been able to sufficiently protect the citizens of the
United States from crime, making the possession of firearms for selfdefense unnecessary.
Given the nationally skyrocketing crime rates, 5 6 it seems clear
that the government is not able to protect the citizenry from
criminals, and, thus, social contract theory indicates that the government cannot justify taking away the citizens' right to defend themselves. This notion echoes Blackstone, who viewed the right to have
suitable arms for self-defense "when the sanctions of society and laws
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression" among
the five "absolute rights of individuals,"157 and Federalist No. 28,
150 MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 139.
151 See Lund, supra note 81, at 118.
152 HOBBES, supra note 143, at 189.
153 See generally THOMA. AQuINAs, ON KINGSHIP 9-10 (Ian Eschmann ed., 1949).
154 See generaly RIcHAD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 7-18 (1985); HOBBES, supra note 143, at 228-39;JoHN LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGIN, ExTENT AND END OF CIVIL GoVERNMENT ch. 8 (1690); LocuE,
supra note 143, at 367.
155 See Lund, supra note 81, at 119-20.
156 See FEERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 22, at 12.

157 1 WiLLIAM BLACISTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 144 (Wdliam Ca-
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which discussed an "original right to self-defense which is paramount
to all positive forms of legal government."158
Given this historical backdrop, the government would have tojustify any interference with an individual's right to self-preservation by
showing that the regulation significantly contributes to the individual's safety.' 5 9 The historical and textual support for the right to bear
arms indicates that the right to self-preservation deserves at least as
much protection as the general rights of privacy and self-expression. 160 In the words of Nelson Lund, "[t]his would be as true as a
matter of common sense even if it could not be asserted as a matter of
61
constitutional law."'
Some commentators argue that the benefit to society from bringing handguns under tight control through the use of legislative mechanisms such as the melting-point laws would, in terms of net benefits
to public safety, outweigh the cost of losing the ability to rely on a
handgun for personal protection. 162 However, empirical evidence
suggests that the prospect of facing an armed victim is more of a deterrent to contemporary violent offenders than the impact of facing
the justice system.1 6 3 One reason for this may be that as punishment
increases in certainty, severity, and promptness, its deterrent value increases accordingly.' 64 For example, the FBI estimated that only forty
percent of all crimes are reported, and of every 100 reported, only
four criminals are apprehended, convicted, and sent to prison. 165
reyJones ed., 1916) (contending that the right to have arms for self-defense is based on
the "natural right of resistance and self-preservation."). Consider, however, that the Canadian legal authorities reject the very idea of armed self-defense in any form, including the
use of Mace, tear-gas canisters, and electric stun-guns. See KOPEL, supranote 40, at 148. As
the father of Canada's modern gun-control legislation, University of Toronto Professor M.
Friedland, puts it, "[a] person who wishes to possess a handgun should have to give a
legitimate reason .... To protect life or property ... should not be a valid reason....

Citizens should rely on the police, security guards, and alarm systems for protection." Id. at
384.
158 THE FEDERAisr No. 28, at 127 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Macy Co. ed., 1945).
159
160

Lund, supra note 81, at 120.
Id.

161 Id.
162

See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, Gun Control: The Good Outweighs the Evil, inTHE Gr.AT

GUN CONTROL DEBATE 12-14 (1976). But see Michael I. Krauss, Americans and their Guns;

Canadians and their Government 1 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("The individual right to keep and bear arms is, like all natural rights, deontological. It
emphatically does not depend for its existence on the maximization of some social utility
function. Even if prohibiting private possession of guns would lower the overall crime rate,
private possession of guns should not be outlawed.") (emphasis omitted).
163 Lund, supra note 81, at n.45.
164 See generally Kleck, supra note 16, at 132. See also Becker, supra note 51, at 18
("[G]reater certainty of apprehension and conviction is an effective deterrent to robbery
and most other serious crimes.").
165 FURNISH & SMALL, supra note 47, at 15.
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Moreover, of every 100 prisoners serving life sentences, twenty-five are
released before their third year, forty-two by their seventh year. 166
Based on an extensive review of the empirical evidence, James
Wilson and Richard Hermstein argue that criminals are less able than
the general populace to conceptualize the results of their acts beyond
the present. 167 Unlike most people involved in academe, who are
used to thinking in terms of the future and are willing to make relatively great sacrifices today for rather speculative returns later,
criminals are more worried about the present consequences of their
actions rather than future consequences.1 68 The possibility of being
shot and killed for breaking and entering a premises in which a gunowner resides has greater and more definite costs than a round in the
United States justice system,' 69 and using melting-point schemes to
eliminate a subset of legally owned handguns would likely leave many
citizens at the mercy of the relatively small segment of the populace
which commits the overwhelming majority of the violent crimes.
The personal safety rationale, thus, seems to provide a reasonable
basis for protecting the citizens' access to handguns. Combining the
fundamental right to self-preservation with the basic postulate of liberal theory, which states that people surrender their natural rights
only to the extent that they are recompensed with more effective political rights, 170 leads to the conclusion that every gun control law must
be justified in terms of the law's contribution to the personal security
17 1
of the citizenry.
VI.

DOES HANDGUN OwNERsHIP HAvE SocAL UTILITY?

Although for many commentators the more speculative and academic legal, historical, and philosophical justifications for firearm
ownership are of great import, others contend that the focus should
really be on the tangible net effect of gun-ownership on society-i.e.,
its social utility. 17 2 Northwestern University School of Law Professor
166 Id.
167
JAMES Q. WILSON & RiCHARDJ. HERENSTrEN, CRiME AND HuMAN NATURE 173-209, 389-

96 (1985).
168 See id.
169 See FURNISH & SMALL, supranote 47, at 57 (finding that only 20 persons were legally

executed, all for murders, between mid-1967 and mid-1984, whereas thousands of
criminals are killed by gun-wielding private citizens every year. "Compared to the murder
rate, the probability of being executed for murder is almost statistically insignificant.");
KI.Eci, supranote 16, at 132 ("Being threatened or shot at by a gun-wielding victim is about
as probable as arrest and substantially more probable than conviction or incarceration.").
170 See generally LocKE, supra note 143, at 53.
171 Lund, supra note 81, at 123.

172 See Posby, supra note 39, at 58-59. Cf Lund, supra note 81, at 112 (arguing that the
Second Amendment is not an "anachronism").
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Daniel Polsby states that
[o]pponents of gun control have'traditionally wrapped their arguments
in the Second Amendment of the Constitution.... But most people are
not dedicated antiquarians, and would not be impressed by the argument "I admit that my behavior is very dangerous to public safety, but
the Second Amendment says I have a right to do it anyway." That would
be a case for repealing the Second Amendment, not respecting it." 73
In the end, the social utility of handgun ownership in the United
States may prove to be the most significant justification for opposing
legislation such as the melting-point laws.
Data reveals that criminals have a tendency to avoid occupied
premises out of fear that the occupants may have a weapon.17 4 This
actually shows a great deal of insight by the criminals, considering that
they are statistically more likely to be shot, detained, or scared away by
an armed citizen than by the police.175 Since the average criminal has
no way of knowing which households are armed and which ones are
unarmed, the benefits of the deterrent effect of gun-ownership are
shared by the community as a whole. 176 Criminals who try to enter an
occupied home are twice as likely to be shot or killed as they are to be
caught, convicted, and imprisoned by the U.S. criminal justice system. 17 7 According to a study conducted by constitutional lawyer and
criminologist Don B. Kates, Jr., only two percent of civilian shootings
involve an innocent civilian mistakenly identified as a criminal,
whereas the police have an "error rate" of almost eleven percent78
almost five times as high.1
In 1980, there were between approximately 8700 and 16,600 nonfatal justifiable or excusable woundings of criminals by armed civilians.17 9 Moreover, in 1981 there were an estimated 1266 excusable
self-defense or justifiable homicides by civilians using guns against
criminals.' 80 By comparison, police officers nationwide killed only
388 felons in 1981.181 Indeed, estimates reveal that in America a fire173 Id.
174 See KLECy, supra note 16, at 138-39.
175 Id. at 43-45.
176 Id. at 104. Cf. Kates supra note 17, at 155 ("[S]ociety only benefits from deterrence if
criminals react by totally eschewing crime, or at least confrontation crime. If the effect
when particular individuals or neighborhoods or communities are perceived as well armed
is only to displace the same crime elsewhere, the benefit to one set of potential victims
comes at the expense of others who are, or are perceived as being, less capable of selfprotection.").
177 Kleck & Bordua, supra note 47, at 282-84.
178 See Snyder, supra note 63, at 50.
179 KLEcK, supranote 16, at 116 (estimating that these figures are equal to less than 2%
of all defensive gun uses).
180 Kleck, supra note 38, at 44.
181 Id.
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arm is used every 16 seconds in self-defense against a criminal, women
use handguns 416 times each day to defend against rapists (which is,
incidentally, twelve times more often than rapists use firearms during
the commission of their crime), and a gun kept in an American home
is 216 times more likely to see use in defense against a criminal than
against an innocent victim. 1 82 These figures have not passed the

criminals by unnoticed. In an oft-cited series of interviews with convicted felons in prisons across the United States, fifty-seven percent
stated that they were scared off or shot at by a citizen, fifty-seven percent feared an armed citizen more than the police, and thirty-seven
83
percent encountered armed citizens during their "careers."'
Fortunately, killing or wounding criminals represents only a small
minority of defensive uses of firearms by civilians. Most civilians use
their weapons to threaten criminals, or, at worst, to fire warningshots.'8 4 In fact, of the estimated 2.5 million instances where gun
owners use their weapons for self-defense each year, over ninety-eight
percent involve neither killings nor woundings. The owners either
fire warning shots or threaten perpetrators by pointing or referring to
their guns.' 8 5 Moreover, the rate of accidental shooting of persons
mistakenly believed to be intruders, a danger which is often emphasized in

the gun control debate, is quite low-1 in

26,000.186

Although the chances that an intruder will be shot are relatively small,
the consequences of a gunshot wound are severe, and the mere possi87
bility will deter many people from attempting confrontation crimes.'
Testimonials from convicted felons further supports the deterrent effect of gun ownership. 188 Fifty-six percent of those questioned
agreed that "a criminal is not going to mess around with a victim he
knows is armed with a gun;" seventy-four percent agreed that "one
reason why burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that
they fear being shot;" 18 9 and fifty-eight percent agreed that "a store
owner who is known to keep a gun on the premises is not going to get
robbed very often."' 9 0 Moreover, forty-three percent of the felons inKrauss, supra note 162, at 2.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
185 See KLcK,supra note 16, at 111-17.
186 FuRNIsH & SMALL, supra note 47, at 50.
187 Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARv.L. REv. 1912, 1915 (1984).
188 JAMES WRIGHT & PETE Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUs: A SURVEY OF
182
183
184

FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 145-46 (1986).

189 This fear of being shot is also the reason why burglary is the one category of violent
crime where the American rate does not exceed the British rate. A 1982 survey showed
that only 13% of U.S. burglars try to enter occupied homes, whereas 59% of British burglars enter homes that are not empty targets. KOPFL, supra note 40, at 92.
190 Id.
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terviewed admitted that they had decided not to commit a crime because they knew or believed that the intended civilian victim carried a
gun. 19 1
Intriguingly, gun ownership appears to have other positive externalities as well; gun owners are more likely than non-gun owners to
aid a person being victimized. Of the "good Samaritans" that come to
a victim's aid, one study indicates that eighty-one percent are gun
owners.' 9 2 Thus, Thomas Jefferson may have been correct when he
gave the following advice to his nephew, Peter Carr:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercise. I
advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it gives
boldness, enterprise and independence to the mind. Games played with
the ball and others of that nature,
are too violent for the body and stamp
93
no character on the mind.'
Jeffrey Snyder sees similar value in gun ownership when he argues
that:
[o]ne who values his life and takes seriously his responsibilities to his
family and community will possess and cultivate the means of fighting
back, and will retaliate when threatened with death or grievous bodily
injury to himself or a loved one. He will never be content to rely solely
on others for his safety. .... 194
The extent to which the knowledge or belief that a civilian carries
a gun can affect felons' perception of risk and alter their criminal
behavior is illustrated by a highly publicized Orlando Police Department gun training program for women which took place in 1966. Orlando, Florida, as well as the entire United States, was experiencing a
rapid increase in rapes, so the Orlando Police Department set up
training seminars to familiarize women with the use of a handgun
and, thereby, reduce future victimization. 195 Within a year, Orlando
experienced an eighty-eight percent drop in the rape rate, whereas
the surrounding area and the United States as a whole experienced
no such decrease. 196 Moreover, this drop in the rate of rapes was
much greater than had occurred in Orlando during any previous
197
year.
Other areas, such as Highland Park, Michigan; New Orleans,
Louisiana; and Detroit, Michigan instituted similar programs and
191 KL.Ec, supra note 16, at 133.
192 Id.
193 Letterfrom Thomasjefferson to Peter Cart in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1943-

1826, at 407 (Julian Boyd ed., 1953).
194 Snyder, supra note 63, at 44.
195 KLEcK, supra note 16, at 134.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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achieved similar results. 198 Kennesaw, Georgia, for example, introduced a city ordinance requiring every household to have a gun, and
after seven months, the burglary rate had dropped eighty-nine percent when compared to the previous year. 199
The lesson from these examples is simply that, to the extent that
citizens are known to be well-armed, the presence of firearms will de00
ter criminal activity.2
As police officers realize, handguns are useful in deterring criminal conduct and stopping such conduct once it has occurred. But this
is not the only advantage of handgun ownership-it also reduces the
likelihood of injury to the victim once the confrontation is in progress. Victimization surveys show that for both robbery and assault,
the victim was less likely to be injured, and the crime was less likely to
be completed, when the victim resisted with a gun as opposed to not
resisting at all.20 1 In fact, robbery and assault victims who used firearms for protection were less susceptible to attack or injury than victims who responded in any other manner (with knives, physical force,
threats, other weapons, or without any self-protection). Only seventeen percent of those using guns to resist attempted robbery, and
twelve percent using guns to resist assault, suffered injury, whereas
twenty-five percent of robbery victims and twenty-seven percent of as20 2
sault victims who did not resist were injured regardless.
It, therefore, appears that handgun ownership is beneficial to
law-abiding citizens, 20 3 and melting-point laws will not only fail in
their goal of reducing violent crime involving the use of handguns,
but they will also make it easier for the criminals to pray on the poor
citizens rendered defenseless to the extent that their legal access to a
handgun is blocked. Moreover, the fact that, despite the growing, media-fueled anti-gun movement in the United States, there has not
been a single state legislature that has banned or severely restricted
handgun ownership strongly suggests a general legislative agreement
Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 87.
199 Id. Cf. Handgun Prohibition,supranote 47, at 155 ("Again, it is debatable exactly why
this ordinance had such an effect.... However, once again the publicized passage of the
ordinance may have served to remind potential burglars in the area of the fact of widespread gun ownership, thereby heightening their perception of the risks of burglary.").
200 Kleck & Bordua, supra note 47, at 282-83. This conclusion is also supported by the
low rate of crime in Switzerland, where criminals know that their potential victims are
likely to be armed (the Swiss society's strong social controls also contribute to their low
crime rate). See KOPEI, supranote 40, at 286-90.
201 KOPFL, supra note 40, at 289-91.
202 Id.
203 In many instances, handguns will be safer than other firearms when used for selfdefense purposes, because the various potential side effects of firing a rifle or shotgun in
an urban environment make their use problematic. See Kates, supranote 47, at 245.
198
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that handguns do have social utility. 2°4
VII.

GuN CONTROL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST THE POOR AND MINORITIES

One undeniable aspect of the history of gun control in the
United States has been the conception that the poor, especially the
non-white poor, cannot be trusted with firearms. 205 Keeping arms
away from blacks had always been an issue; in fact, the first ever mention of blacks in Virginia's laws was a 1644 provision barring free
blacks from owning firearms.2 0 6 Similar to the English attitudes towards gun ownership by Catholics, who were considered to be potential subversives, black slaves and Native Americans were the suspect
20 7
populations of the New World.
Considering that the effect of melting-point laws is the removal of
the least expensive guns from the market, and that the discussion thus
far has pointed to the apparent ineffectiveness of current crime control measures, one could persuasively argue that the legislatures have
a desire to keep guns out of the hands of the poor and minorities.
Acceptance of the preceding arguments that melting-point laws (1)
do not reduce crime, (2) actually decrease the likelihood of criminals
being caught on the basis of their use of a handgun which passes the
melting-point requirements, and (3) prevent citizens from deterring
criminal activity and protecting themselves from criminals leaves few
alternative explanations for the legislators' motivations. A National
Institute of Justice Study found that:
The people most likely to be deterred from acquiring a handgun by exceptionally high prices or by the nonavailability of certain kinds of handguns are not felons intent on arming themselves for criminal purposes
(who can, if all else fails, steal the handgun they want), but rather poor
people who have decided they need a gun to protect themselves against
the felons but who find that the cheapest gun in the market costs more
than they can afford to pay. 20 8
204 See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983) ("[T]he
social utility of an activity that. . . enables some people to defend themselves cannot be
denied.").
205 See Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 67.
206 SM WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACx: AMEmRc
ATrITUDEs TowARD THE
NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 78 (1968). See also Comment, CarryingConcealed Weapons, 15 VA. L.
REG. 391-92 (1909) ("It is a matter of common knowledge that in this state and several
others, the more especially in the Southern states, where the negro population is so large,
that this cowardly practice of 'toting' guns has been one of the most fruitful sources of
crime.... Let a negro board a railroad train with a quart of mean whiskey and a pistol in
his grip and the chances are that there will be a murder, or at least a row, before he
alights.").
207 See MALcoLm, supranote 76, at 140.
208 WIGHT AND ROSSI, supra note 188, at 238.
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As David Kopel points out, "[t]he point of banning 'cheap' guns is
that people who can only afford cheap guns should not have guns.
The prohibitively high price that some firearms licenses carry ($500 in
Miami until recently) suggests a contemporary intent to keep guns
2 09
away from lower socioeconomic groups."
Melting-point laws take less expensive guns off the market, and
while there is no shortage of expensive guns, poorer citizens may not
be able to afford them and must make due with what they can afford.
A closer look at the historical relationship between gun control and
the poor in America reveals that a charge of discrimination on the
part of the legislators who enacted the melting-point laws might not
be too far-fetched.
An undisguised admission of the discriminatory motive underlying attempts to make handguns more expensive appears in an article
on Saturday Night Specials written by gun control advocate Philip
Cook:
Individuals who would not ordinarily be able to afford an expensive gun
commit a disproportionate share of violent crimes. Setting a high minimum price for handguns would be an effective means of reducing availability to precisely those groups that account for the bulk of the violent
crime problem.... The major normative argument against a high tax is
that it is overt economic discriminationand thus unethical, or at leastpolitically

unpalatable... A high tax is not the only method of increasingthe minimum pricefor handguns and subtle approaches may be more acceptable politically. One method would establish minimum standards stipulating the
quality of metal and safety features of a gun. The effect of this approach
would be the same as the minimum tax: to eliminate the cheapest of the
domestically manufactured handguns. Unlike minimum tax, however,
quality and safety standards could be justified on grounds other than
economic discrimination.... If sufficiently high standards on safety and
metal quality were adopted, the cost to manufacturers
of meeting these
standards would ensure a high minimum price.21 0
Early firearm laws were often enacted for the sole purpose of
preventing immigrants, blacks, and other ethnic minorities from obtaining a gun.2 1 ' Even today, police departments have a wide range of
latitude in granting gun permits, yet they rarely issue them to the poor
212
or to minority citizens.
The poor are often prevented from possessing a firearm even
209 KOPEL, supra note 40, at 344.

210 See Cook, supra note 1, at 1740 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
211 Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 67. See also Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudenceof
the Second and FourteenthAmendments, 4 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1981); Raymond G.
Kessler, Gun Control and PoliticalPower,5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 381 (1983).
212 See Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 67.

T. MARKUS FUNK

[Vol. 85

though the poor are disproportionately victims of crime. 213 Compounding this situation is the fact that the poorer areas of cities
(where most of the crime occurs) rarely get the same police protection that the more affluent areas get (where the least crime occurs) .214
As Gary Kleck puts it:
Gun ownership costs more money than simple measures such as locking
doors, having neighbors watch one's house, or avoidance behaviors such
as not going out at night, but it costs less than buying and maintaining a
dog, paying a security guard, or buying a burglar alarm system. Consequently, it is a self-protection measure available 2to15 many low-income people who cannot afford more expensive alternatives.

Therefore, any gun control measure which takes cheaper guns off the
market and prevents the poor from obtaining a handgun for self-defense is arguably doubly unfair. In Delahanty v. Hinckley, a federal district court in Washington, D.C. found that Saturday Night Special laws
selectively disarm minorities. 21 6 The court stated that:
The fact is, of course, that while blighted areas may be some of the
breeding places of crime, not all residents of [sic] are so engaged, and
indeed, most persons who live there are lawabiding but have no other
choice of location. But they, like their counterparts in other areas of the
city, may seek to protect themselves, their families and their property
against crime, and indeed, may feel an even greater need to do so since
the crime rate in their community may be higher than in other areas of
the city. Since one of the reasons they are likely to be living in the
"ghetto" may be due to low income or employment, it is highly unlikely
that they would have217
the resources or worth to buy an expensive handgun for self defense.
Although bans on particular types of firearms have been enacted
under the guise of controlling crime throughout American history,
the actual effect they have often had was to disarm poor people and
minorities. 2 18 In 1640, Virginia set up the first recorded restrictive
legislation which prevented blacks from owning a firearm, and the
Virginia law was said to set blacks apart from all other groups by deny213 Id. at 68. See also CHARLEs

MuRRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERIcAN SoCIAL PouICY, 1950-

1980, at 119-20 (1984).
214 See Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 68.
215 KLEcx, supra note 16, at 104 (emphasis added).
216 Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1986).
217 Id. at 928.

218 See RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an
Afro-American Reconsideration, 80 GEO. LJ. 309, 354-55 (1991). The notion of restricting
gun ownership to the rich is nothing new, however. The English Game Act of 1609, for
example, required a would-be hunter to have income from land of at least £40 a year, or a
life estate of £80, or personal property worth at least £400. See MALcoL, supra note 76, at
71-75 ("The use of an act for the preservation of game was a customary means to curb
lower-class violence.").
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ing them" the important right and obligation of carrying a gun. 21 9
Legislators in the southern states not only restricted the rights of
slaves, but also the rights of free blacks to bear arms. The intention
was to restrict the availability of arms to both free blacks and slaves to
the extent that the restrictions were consistent with the regional ideas
of safety.220 .
Reflecting this attitude, Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority in the 1856 Dred Scott decision, stated that if blacks were
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, ... [i]t would give
persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one
state of the union, the right ... . to keep and bear arms wherever they

went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the
same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent
and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and
221
safety of the State ....
Tennessee was the first state to utilize creative melting-point style
draftsmanship to prevent gun ownership by blacks in the 1870s. Tennessee barred the sale of all handguns except the "Army and Navy"
guns which were already owned by ex-confederate soldiers. 222 Since
the poor freedmen could not afford these expensive firearms, the
"Army and Navy Law" is considered the predecessor of today's melt2 23
ing-point laws.

After the Civil War, southerners were fearful of race war and retribution, and the mere sight of a black person with a gun was terrifying
to southern whites.2 2 4 As a result, several southern legislatures
adopted comprehensive regulations which were known as the "Black
Codes." 225 These codes denied the newly freed men many of the
219

JORDAN, supra note 206, at 78, cited in Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 69-70.

220 See, e.g., An Act Concerning Slaves, § 6, 1840 Laws of Tex. 171, 172, ch. 58 of the

Texas Acts of 1850 (prohibiting slaves from using firearms altogether from 1842-1850); Act
of Mar. 15, 1852, ch. 206, 1852 Laws of Miss. 328 (forbade ownership of firearms to both
free blacks and slaves after 1852); Kentucky Acts of 1818, ch. 448 (providing that, should
free blacks or slaves "willfully or maliciously" shoot a white person, or otherwise wound a
free white person while attempting to kill another person, the slave or free black should
suffer the death penalty).
221 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1856).
222 See KoPEL, supra note 40, at 336. See also KATms, supra note 138, at 14 ("Klansmen
were not inconvenienced [by the legislation], having long since acquired their guns ... ,
nor were the company goons, professional strike-breakers, etc., whose weapons were supplied by their corporate employers. By 1881 white supremacists were in power in the
neighboring state of Arkansas and had enacted a virtually identical 'Saturday Night Special' law with virtually identical effect.").
223 Kates, supra note 138, at 14 ("The 'Army and Navy Law' is the ancestor of today's
'Saturday Night Special' laws.").
224 See KoPEL, supra note 40, at 333.
225 See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 588-891 (statement by Sen. Donelley
giving examples of enacted codes).
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rights that whites enjoyed. In 1867, the Special Report of the AntiSlavery Conference noted that under the Black Codes, blacks were
"forbidden to own or bear firearms, and thus were rendered defenseless against assaults."2 26 As an illustration of such legislation, the Mississippi Black Code contained the following provision:
Be it enacted... [t] hat no freedman, free negro or mulatto, not in the
military... and not licensed to do by the board of police of his or her
county, shall keep or carry fire-arms of any kind, or any ammunition ....
and all such arms or ammunition shall be forfeited to the former .... 227

In United States v. Cruikshank,228 a case which is often cited as authoritative by Handgun Control, Incorporated and many other guncontrol organizations, 2 29 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Ku Klux Klan's repressive actions against blacks who wanted to own
guns, thus allowing the Klan and other racist groups to forcibly disarm
the freedmen and impose white supremacy.23 0 "Firearms in the Reconstruction South provided a means of political power for many.
They were the symbols of the new freedom for blacks ....

In the end,

white southerners triumphed and the blacks were effectually disarmed."2 3' The legislators' intent to disarm blacks also appears in the
voiding of a 1941 conviction of a white man, where Florida Supreme
CourtJustice Buford, in his concurring opinion, stated that "[t] he Act
was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers ....
[It]
was never intended to be applied to the white population and in prac232
tice has never been so applied."
But blacks were not the only ones whom legislators wanted to disarm; in the nineteenth century, southern states also placed restrictions on gun-ownership for certain "undesirable" whites. 233 For
226 Reprinted in HAROLD HymAN, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUGTION 219
(1967), cited in Tahmassebi, supranote 93, at 71. For compelling anecdotal evidence showing the necessity for blacks to defend themselves through the use of firearms during the
civil rights era, see Don B. Kates,Jr., TheNeessety ofAccess to Firearmsby Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to Prote, in REsrRIGTNG HANDGUNS (1979) ;John
R, Slater, Jr., Civil Rights and Self-Defens AGAINST THE CURRENT, July/August 1988, at 23.

227
228

1866 Miss. Laws ch. 23, § 1, at 165 (1865), cited in Tahmassebi, supranote 93, at 71.
92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the right to assemble and the right to bear arms

were natural rights predating the Constitution, and that the Constitution merely gave validity to these rights. "[Blearing arms for a lawful purpose.. . is not a right granted by the
Constitution."). Many feel that this decision essentially ruined the Fourteenth Amendment as a check on state abuses of human rights until its resurrection in the 1920s. See, e.g.,
KoPEL, supra note 40, at 335.
229 Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 75.
230 See KOPEL, supra note 40, at 335.
231 LAURENCE KENNET & JAMEs L. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICmA THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL DILEMMA 50 (1975), cited in Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 69.
232 Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941), cited in Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at
69.
233 See KATES, supra note 138, at 14; Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 77.
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example, the 1911 Sullivan Law23 4 was passed to keep guns out of the

hands of immigrants (chiefly Italians-"[i]n the first three years of the
Sullivan Law, [roughly] 70 percent of those arrested had Italian surnames" 23 5 ). Two NewYork newspapers reveal the mind-set which gave
rise to the Sullivan Law: the New York Tribune grumbled about pistols
found "'chiefly in the pockets of ignorant and quarrelsome immigrants of law-breaking propensities,'" 23 6 and the New York Times
pointed out the "affinity of 'low-browed foreigners' for handguns." 23 7
Tennessee Senator John K. Shields introduced a bill in the
United States Congress to prohibit the shipment of pistols through
the mails and by common carrier in interstate commerce. 238 The report supporting the bill that Senator Shields inserted into the Congressional Record asked: "Can not we, the dominant race, upon
whom depends the enforcement of the law, so enforce the law that we
will prevent the colored people from preying upon each other?" 23 9 In
addition to blacks and foreigners, the legislators in the southern states
also targeted agrarian agitators and labor organizers at the end of the
nineteenth century (particularly in Alabama, in 1893, and Texas, in
1907).240 Furthermore, heavy transaction and business taxes were im-

posed "on handgun sales in order to resurrect the economic barriers
2 41
to [gun] ownership."
Similarly, today's melting-point laws arguably reflect the old
American prejudice that lower classes and minorities cannot be
trusted with weapons. While the legislative bias which originated in
the South may have changed in form, it apparently still exists. 2 42 But

pro-gun groups are not the only ones to acknowledge this unfortunate
reality. Gun control proponent and journalist Robert Sherrill frankly
admitted that the Gun Control Act of 1968 was "passed not to control
guns but to control blacks," 243 and Barry Bruce-Briggs stated in no
234 N.Y. PEiNAL LAw § 1897 (Consol. 1909) (amended 1911).
235 KoPEL, supra note 40, at 343. See also Kates, supra note 138,

at 15 ("Across the land,
legislators in conservative states were importuned by business lobbyists bearing glowing
endorsements of the Sullivan Law concept from such (then) arch-conservative institutions
as the New York Times and the American Bar Association.").
236 KoPEL, supra note 40, at 342-43 (quoting New York Tribune, Nov. 19, 1903, at 6).
237 Id. at 343.
238 65 CONG. REC. S3945 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1924).
239 Id. § 3946.
240 See Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 76.
241 Hates, supra note 138, at 15. "Moreover, in ensuing years those who ruled the South
found that there were challengers other than the blacks against whom the forces of social
control might have to be exerted. Agrarian agitators arose to inform poor whites that they
were trading their political and economic group identity for a fraudulent racial solidarity
with a false imperative of preserving white supremacy." Id. at 13.
242 Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 80.
243 ROBERT SHERmL, THE SATURDAY NiGTrr SPECIAL 280 (1973), cited in Tahmassebi,
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uncertain terms that " [i] t is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
'Saturday night special' is emphasized because it is cheap and is being
sold to a particular class of people."244 The names given to Saturday

Night Specials and provisions aimed at limiting their availability provide ample evidence-the name of this gun type derived from the racist phrase "nigger-town Saturday night,"245 and the reference is to

246
"ghetto control" rather than gun control.
As noted, poor blacks are disproportionately the victims of
crime, 24 7 and in 1992, black males between the ages of twenty and
twenty-four were four times more likely to be victimized in a handgun
crime than white males in the same age group.24 8 As Stefan Tahmassebi points out:
[Although blacks are disproportionately victimized], these citizens are
often not afforded the same police protections that other more affluent
and less crime ridden neighborhoods or communities enjoy. This lack
of protection is especially so in the inner city urban ghettos. Firearms
prohibitions discriminate against those poor and minority citizens who
must rely on such arms to defend themselves from criminal activity to a
much greater degree249
than affluent citizens living in safer and better protected communities.
Victims must be able to defend themselves and their families
against criminals as soon as crime strikes, and the ability to defend
oneself, family, and property is more critical in the poor and minority
neighborhoods, which are ravaged by crime and do not have adequate
police protection.2 50 Since the courts have consistently ruled that the
police have no duty to protect the individual citizen, 25 1 and that there

supranote 93, at 80.
244 Barry Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INTERFSr 37, 50 (1976).
245 Id.
246 See KLxcy, supranote 16, at 89.
247 See MuRRAY, supra note 213, at 120.
248 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1.
249 Tahmassebi, supra note 93, at 68.
250 Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun ControL" ProhibitionRevisite4 INQUIRY, Dec. 5, 1977, at 21.
See also Ki~cI, supra note 16, at 86-87 ("Effective [Saturday Night Special] measures would
disproportionately affect the law-abiding poor, since it is they who are most likely to own
[Saturday Night Specials] and obey the laws, and who are least likely to have the money to
buy better quality, and therefore higher-priced, weapons.... Whereas it might not be easy
for the law-abiding poor to buy a more expensive gun, few career criminals willing to assault and rob would lack the additional $50-100 it would take to purchase a gun not
falling into the [Saturday Night Special] category."). The reality that criminals do not
utilize the less expensive variety of handguns is underscored by the dramatic increase in
the use of high quality (and high capacity) handguns during criminal episodes. Chenow,
supra note 26.
251 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989) ("[T he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
.. "); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981) ("[The] government and
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is "no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being
murdered-by criminals or madmen," 2 52 citizens, regrettably, are in the
position of having to defend themselves. While the deterrent effect of
the police surely wards off many would-be criminals (particularly in
areas where the police patrol more frequently-i.e., more affluent areas), the many citizens who need personal protection must face the
reality that the police do not and cannot function as bodyguards for
ordinary people.2 53 Therefore, individuals must remain responsible
for their own personal protection, with the police providing only an
auxiliary general deterrent.
Far from being an implement of destruction, a handgun can inspire a feeling of security and safety in a person living in this crimeridden society.25 4 And inexpensive handguns provide affordable protection to lower income individuals who are the most frequent victims
of crime. 255 People who accept the preceding analysis with regard to
the deterrent value of handguns and the lack ofjustification for melting-point laws must face the troubling prospect that melting-point
laws purposefully reduce poor citizens' access to handguns, significantly impairing their ability to survive in the harsh environments in
which they must subsist
VIII.

Do

MELTING-POINT LAWS VioLATE THE EQUAL PROTEGION

CLAUSE?
As discussed in Section VII, it is reasonable to suspect that covert
discriminatory purposes underlie the passage of the melting-point
laws and similar gun-control legislation. 25 6 While it is unrealistic to
expect the Supreme Court, given its present composition, to rule that
melting-point laws are constitutionally impermissible in the near future, it is possible to argue that the case of Village of ArlingtonHeights v.
its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection,
to any particular individual citizen."). See also Everton v.'Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla.
1985); South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396 (1855).
252 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
253 Kates, supra note 17, at 124 ("If the circumstances permit, the police will protect a
citizen in distress. But they are not legally duty bound to do even that, nor to provide any
direct protection ....A fortiori the police have no responsibility to, and generally do not,
provide personal protection to private citizens who have been threatened.").
254 See Note, supra note 187, at 1915 ("[H]andguns provide their owners with a psychic
security that cannot be easily measured.").
255 See KLEcK, supra note 16, at 86.
256 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan's proposed tax on gun sales and on the purchase of
ammunition is one example. See Becker, supra note 51, at 18 (arguing that such a tax
would increase the number of guns in the hands of criminals and raise the incidence of
crime).
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Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.257 provides a possible framework for invalidating the legislation on the basis of racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Arlington Heights concerned the refusal by a local zoning board to
change the classification of a tract of land from single-family to multifamily. While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial, in light of its "historical
context,"258 was racially discriminatory and, therefore, a violation of
equal protection, 259 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, overturned this verdict The Court held that "[o]fficial action will not be
held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportional impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.'" 2 60 A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision,
the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures,
and contemporary statements of the decision-makers must be
shown. 2 6' While proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff is not required to "prove that the challenged action rested solely on
racially discriminatory purposes." 262 The Court held that "[w]hen
there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating
26 3
factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified."
To determine whether "invidious" discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor, the court must engage in a "sensitive inquiry" into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available,
and the Court has held that the "impact of the official action[]whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another"[-]may
provide an important starting point."264 The Court stated that the
265
"historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source."
Given the history of racist gun control legislation in the United
States, 2 66 a case can be made that the historical background of legisla257

429 U.S. 252 (1977).

258 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 418
(7th Cir. 1975).
259 Id.
260 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977) (citation omitted).
261 Id. at 253. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (i973)
(holding that mere disproportionate impact on the poor is legal).
262 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (emphasis added).
263 Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added).
264 Id. at 266.
265 Id. at 267.
266 See supra notes 204 to 284 and accompanying text.
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tion such as the melting-point laws, the apparent lack of rational justification for the laws, and the laws' ultimate effect of making handguns
less accessible to the poor lends some potency to the argument that
the passage of the melting-point laws was motivated at least in part by
the legislators' improper discriminatory considerations.
Of course, proof that an official decision was racially motivated
does not necessarily invalidate a statute, but instead shifts the burden
to the defendant to show that the "same decision would have resulted
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered." 2 67 While
it may be possible to argue that, given the apparent lack of justification for melting-point laws, the legislators would not have enacted
melting-point laws in the absence of a discriminatory motive, this argument is unlikely to succeed as a practical matter, given the difficulty
of proving discriminatory intent, particularly through direct evidence,
26
on the part of the politically astute legislators.
In the absence of an avowed racial motive, disproportionate impact does not trigger strict scrutiny (thus, the melting point law is
tested only under the rationalrelationshiptest, under which it likely will
stand).269 However, if the activity at issue implicates a fundamental
right,2 70 courts will apply a strict scrutiny test, requiring a showing that
a compelling need for the different treatment exists and that the means
chosen are necessary.2 71 If strict scrutiny applies, the law cannot be
substantially overinclusive or underinclusive or both.2 72 To find strict
scrutiny applicable in the absence of a clearly racial motive or effect,
however, the classification must touch on a substantive constitutional
right.2 73 Considering that the Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right to own arms, courts should apply strict scrutiny. And
in light of the language in Arlington and the previous discussion of the
apparent counter-productiveness of melting-point laws, the legislation
274
appears unconstitutional.
267

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271.

268 See, e.g., Edward Patrick Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racim Envi-

ronmentalDiscrimination,and the Argument for ModernizingEqual ProtectionAnalysis, 46 VAND.
I REV. 937, 939 (1993) (arguing that legislators will rarely include racist reasoning in the
public record and that plaintiff is unlikely to have access to other evidentiary sources).
269 SeeJoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTYNDA, CONSTITrONAL LAxv, § 14.3, at 576 (4th
ed. 1991).
270 See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
271 NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 269, at 575-76 (describing the strict scrutiny test).
272 See Troy PR Holroyd, Comment, Homosexuals and the Military:IntegrationorDiscrimination?, 8J. Corr.mp. HEALTH L. & POL'y 429, 441-42 (1992).
273 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. See also Holroyd, supra note
272, at 441-42.
274 This raises a question similar to whether the First Amendment could void a building
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CONCLUSION

The justifications for melting-point laws appear to lack merit
they do not prevent ballistics and forensics experts from tracing a particular gun to a particular shooter; they do not contribute to crime
reduction; they are arbitrary; and they may be motivated by discriminatory intentions. Melting-point laws, therefore, should be abandoned and legislative action should instead be aimed at reducing gun
possession among persons with prior records of violence. While melting-point legislation prevents many of the nation's poorer citizens
from legally protecting themselves from their dangerous environment, no convincing factual, public policy, or legal arguments justify
this outcome. Although handgun violence undeniably is a serious
problem in American society, preventing those who have a legal right
to protect themselves with a handgun from doing so on the basis of
socioeconomic considerations simply cannot be the solution. Blaming the instrument for its misuse by a minority of criminals itself seems
perverse. As criminologist Gary Kleck pointed out:
Fixating on guns seems to be, for many people, a fetish which allows
[gun-control advocates] to ignore the more intransigent causes of American violence, including its dying cities, inequality, deteriorating family
structure, and the all-pervasive economic and social consequences of a
history of slavery and racism ....

All parties to the crime debate would

do well to give more concentrated attention to more difficult, but far
more relevant, issues like how to generate more good-payingjobs for275the
underclass, an issue which is at the heart of the violence problem.
Legislators should consider methods such as mandatory penalties
for the misuse of guns in violent crimes and for the possession of stolen guns.2 76 After adopting mandatory penalties for the use of a fire-

arm in the commission of a violent crime in 1975, the murder rate in
Virginia dropped thirty-six percent and the robbery rate dropped
twenty-four percent in twelve years. 2 77 South Carolina recorded a
code which applies to all buildings, including churches and newspapers, and which results
in higher costs which may mean that poor people cannot afford to build a church or
operate a newspaper. Analogy raised in letter from Don B. Kates,Jr. (Oct. 9, 1994) (on file
with author).
275 Gary Kleck, Guns and Viwlence: A Summary of the Fiel4 Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association 18 (Aug. 29, 1991), cited in Kopm, supranote 40, at 391.
276 See Robert A. O'Hare, Jr. &Joroge Pedreira, An UncertainRight: The Second Amendment
and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 179, 204-05 (1992) (arguing that as long as "dealers can penetrate U.S. borders and reap millions of dollars in
illegal profits," they will be able to arm themselves accordingly-therefore, it is not the
criminal, but the law-abiding citizen who will be affected most by gun control). It follows
that those who misuse firearms should be severely penalized and those who merely possess
them should not. Becker, supra note 51, at 18 ("[A] state mandatory term sends a clear
signal about the risk of using guns to perpetrate crimes.").
277 NRA INsT. FOR LEGISIAT'E ACriON, TEN MYrHs ABOUT GUN CONTROL 21 (1989).
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thirty-seven percent murder rate decline between 1975 and 1987 with
a similar law.2 78 Other notable declines in states using mandatory
penalties occurred in Arkansas (homicide rate down thirty-two percent in thirteen years), Delaware (homicide rate down twenty-six percent in fifteen years), and Montana (homicide rate down eighteen
percent in eleven years).279
Mandatory gun-training seminars are also effective. 280 Describing
the differences between rural and urban gun owners, criminologist
Gary Kleck stated:
Most gun ownership is culturally patterned, linked with a rural hunting
sub-culture. The culture is transmitted across generations, with gun
owners being socialized by their parents into gun ownership and use
from childhood. Defensive handgun owners, on the other hand, are
more likely to be disconnected from any gun subcultural roots, and their
gun ownership is usually not accompanied by association
with other gun
28 1
owners by the training in the safe handling of guns.
Mandatory gun-safety training, therefore, may go far in preventing
firearm accidents by training those who have no background in hunting or shooting how to use a firearm properly.
Legislators should also seriously consider proposals calling for
the appointment of at least one Assistant U.S. Attorney per District
who is charged with prosecuting felon-in-possession cases which involve violent offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924.282 Moreover, the reform
and streamlining of probation revocation in such a way that those persons eligible for probation who commit violent armed felonies will
have their probation revoked immediately, the creation of prison facilities that are designed solely for the purpose of ensuring that violent
repeat offenders actually serve their full sentences, 28 3 and the establishment of a task force which can informally pressure the entertainment industry to put an end to the incessant and reckless portrayal of
278

Id.

279 Id.
280 See Peril or Protection?, supranote 47, at 290. ("[C]itizens willing to invest some time
can be schooled in defensive firearms use to at least the same level of competence as the
average police officer.").
281 See KI cz, supra note 16, at 47. See also FuRNISH & SMAL, supra note 47, at 51
("[F]irearms need not be a source of accidents if the householder and other occupants of
the home are adequately trained in their proper use and care, and especially in the manner in which they are kept inaccessible to others besides the owner .... ").
282 ERIC C. MORGAN & DAVID B. KOPEL, THE 'AssAULT WEAPON' PANIc 67 (1993) (Independence Institute issue paper) ("More consistent enforcement of existing statutes would
directly target criminal misuse of all firearms. State and localities could also assign prosecutors to felons perpetrating violent crimes with firearms.")
283 Id. ("This reform would have prevented a career criminal named Eugene Thompson
from perpetrating a murder spree in the suburbs south of Denver in March 1989.").
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criminal misuse of firearms2 8 4 are all policy proposals that present realistic alternatives to the troubling movement towards handgun
prohibition. 285
Both the Constitution and the history of the United States grant
citizens the right to own a handgun. All of the states and several territories of the United States, as well as the federal government itself,
recognize the sale of firearms as a lawful activity,2 86 and both practical
experience and empirical evidence appear to indicate that the right to
own a handgun benefits society as a whole.
Some legislators, apparently due to either misinformation or personal biases (both racial and socioeconomic), have enacted meltingpoint laws that remove many of the lower-cost guns from the market
as a method of crime prevention. Melting-point laws, however, merely
bar those of lesser economic means from having a way to protect
themselves against the criminals that prey on them, and such an outcome is neither fair, nor is it criminologically sound.

284 Id. ("While a direct link between [the glamorizing of 'assault weapon' misuse in

prime-time television shows such as Riptide, 21Jump Street, and Miami Vice] and criminal
violence may be difficult to establish, at least one study has linked television and movie
depictions of 'assault weapons' to increased sales of those weapons.").
285 Id.
286 See BuREAu OF ALCOHOL, TOBAcco AND FIREARms, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATE

LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDiNANCES-FIREARMS (1989); Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 921-28 (1988). The Act allows persons to engage in firearm trade upon compliance
with applicable licensing procedures. Id. § 923. Additionally, the Act delineates exemptions from the prohibition of firearm ownership or control. Id. § 925.

